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Broadening the Time Frame for Assessing a Police 






When a police officer’s use of deadly force kills or seriously injures a 
civilian, that officer may face civil liability or criminal prosecution. In both civil and 
criminal cases, a critical question that the jury must decide is whether the officer’s 
use of force was reasonable or excessive. As a general matter, the jury will be 
advised that it should consider all the relevant facts and circumstances—the totality 
of the circumstances—to answer this question.  
An officer’s decisions and conduct prior to that officer’s use of deadly force 
can create jeopardy for the civilian and the officer, increasing the risk of an officer-
civilian encounter turning into a deadly confrontation. In cases involving officer-
created jeopardy, the trial court must decide whether to restrict the jury to 
considering only the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the moment the 
officer chose to use deadly force or allow the jury to consider antecedent conduct of 
the officer that created or increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. The lower 
courts are split over whether a narrow or a broad time frame is appropriate and the 
U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly taken a position on this issue. This Article 
argues that courts overseeing criminal prosecutions of police officers should 
broaden the time frame and allow juries assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s 
use of deadly force to consider pre-shooting conduct of the officer that created or 
increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. 
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 Hypothetical 1. A police officer in uniform and on patrol on Jefferson Street 
sees a black SUV driving at a high speed northbound in his direction. He hears over 
the radio dispatch that an armed white man driving a black SUV is northbound on 
Jefferson Street fleeing the scene of a bank robbery. The officer tells dispatch that 
he may have spotted the suspect and will try to arrest him. Seeing a white male 
behind the wheel of the black SUV, the officer gets out of his patrol car and runs in 
front of the moving vehicle with his gun drawn, shouting “Stop! Show me your 
hands!” The motorist fails to stop and instead starts to drive slowly towards the 
officer. When the motorist starts to get close to the officer, the officer shoots at the 
motorist through the front windshield, killing him. The officer claims he honestly 
and reasonably believed it was necessary to use deadly force to protect himself from 
being killed or seriously injured by the motorist.1  
 Hypothetical 2. Shortly after midnight, police officers with a hunch that 
large quantities of drugs are within a home bust through the front door with a 
battering ram and enter without knocking and identifying themselves as police prior 
to entry. The homeowner, a licensed gun owner, is sleeping in his bed when he hears 
a loud commotion that sounds like someone is breaking into his house. He grabs his 
gun, loads it, and rushes downstairs where he sees two men in the front foyer of his 
home with guns drawn. Thinking the men are about to rob him, the homeowner fires 
off a shot at the men, hitting one of them in the leg. In response, the officers shoot 
several rounds at the homeowner. One of their shots hits the homeowner and kills 
him. The officers claim they honestly and reasonably believed it was necessary to 
shoot the homeowner to protect themselves from being shot and killed.2 
                                                            
1 This fact pattern is loosely based on the facts of a case in which a Wethersfield, 
Connecticut police officer attempted to pull over a motorist in April 2019 after noticing 
that the license plate on the motorist’s car did not match the registration information for the 
vehicle. Dave Collins, Officer is found justified in fatal shooting of driver, 18, ABC NEWS 
(Mar 18, 2020, 11:25 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/officer-found-justified-
fatal-shooting-driver-18-69671125 (https://perma.cc/UJB6-WAAW). The motorist, 
Anthony Jose “Chulo” Vega Cruz, came to a brief stop. Ryan Lindsay, et al., Videos of 
Fatal Wethersfield Police Shooting Released, CT MIRROR (May 3, 2019), 
https://ctmirror.org/2019/05/03/videos-of-fatal-wethersfield-police-shooting-released/ 
(https://perma.cc/ZWP8-6MK6). The officer exited his vehicle and tried to approach the 
stopped car on foot, but before he could complete the traffic stop, the motorist drove away. 
Id. A police chase ensued. Id. Another officer, Layau Eulizier, joined the pursuit and 
rammed into Vega Cruz’s vehicle head on, bringing it to a stop. Id. Police dashcam and 
other surveillance videos show Officer Eulizier getting out of his vehicle and running 
towards the vehicle with his gun drawn, then running in front of the car as the car was 
beginning to pull away and firing multiple times into the front windshield of the car. Id. 
Officer Eulizier claims he shouted “Show me your hands” three times before shooting. Id. 
Vega Cruz died two days after being shot. Id.  
2 This fact pattern is loosely based on the facts of the Breonna Taylor case but the facts in 
this hypothetical are different in significant ways from the facts in the Breonna Taylor case. 
First, unlike the facts in this hypothetical where the officers entered the home based on a 
mere hunch and without a search warrant, the police in the Breonna Taylor case sought and 
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 One considering these hypotheticals might say that the officers’ actions 
were unreasonable because in each case, the officer's unwise (and, in Hypothetical 
2, illegal) conduct preceding the fatal confrontation created the need for the use of 
deadly force. If, however, we narrow the time frame of events and focus solely on 
the moment that the officers pulled the trigger, the officer's conduct may appear 
reasonable. Ordinarily, an officer who finds himself in the path of a moving vehicle 
coming at him can claim that he reasonably believed it was necessary to shoot the 
driver to stop the driver from hitting him. An officer confronting a person with a gun 
who shoots or appears as if he is about to shoot the officer can claim he reasonably 
believed it was necessary to shoot the person in order to protect himself from being 
shot. Only when we broaden the time frame and consider whether any antecedent 
conduct of the officer created or increased the likelihood of a deadly confrontation, 
does the conduct of these officers appear less reasonable. 
 “Officer-created jeopardy” refers to situations in which police officers 
unwisely put themselves in danger and then use force to protect themselves.3 As 
                                                            
secured a search warrant in advance of entering Taylor’s residence. Search Warrant for 
3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020); Darcy 
Costello & Tessa Duvall, Minute by Minute: What Happened the Night Louisville Police 
Fatally Shot Breonna Taylor, Louisville Courier J. (May 15, 2020, 7:25 PM), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2020/05/14/minute-minute-account-breonna-
taylor-fatal-shooting-louisville-police/5182824002/ (https://perma.cc/L93R-6BQR) 
[hereinafter Costello & Duvall, Minute by Minute] (noting that Louisville Metropolitan 
Police Department Detective Joshua Jaynes wrote five affidavits seeking a judge's 
permission for no-knock searches for five different residences, one of which was for 
Breonna Taylor’s apartment, related to a narcotics investigation and that Jefferson Circuit 
Judge Mary Shaw issued all five no knock search warrants). Additionally, unlike the police 
in this hypothetical, the police in the Breonna Taylor case requested a no-knock warrant, 
which authorizes police officers to enter a home without knocking and identifying 
themselves prior to entering the home. See Jaynes Aff. for Search Warrant for 3003 
Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020); Wayne R. 
LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure: a Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §4.8(g) (6th ed. 2020). 
The judicial officer who issued the search warrant for Breonna Taylor’s apartment 
incorporated by reference the affidavit that requested a no-knock warrant. Search Warrant 
for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020). 
Finally, unlike the facts in the hypothetical where the police failed to knock and announce 
prior to entry, it appears the officers in the Breonna Taylor case did knock prior to entry 
although there is a dispute over whether the officers identified themselves as police 
officers. See Doha Madani, FBI investigating death of Breonna Taylor, killed by police in 
her Louisville home, NBCNews.com (5-21-2020) (4:27 PM EDT) (reporting that a police 
spokesperson claimed the officers knocked on the door several times and “announced their 
presence as police” prior to entry), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-
investigating-death-breonna-taylor-killed-police-her-louisville-home-n1212381 
(https://perma.cc/9C8U-2U2C); Costello & Duvall, Minute by Minute, supra (reporting that 
attorneys for Taylor’s family explained that she and her boyfriend, Kenneth Walker, heard 
loud banging and called out to see who was there but did not hear a response). 
3 Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Death Resulted from “Officer-Created Jeopardy.” So Why 
Were No Other Officers Indicted?, SLATE (Dec. 28, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-
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Seth Stoughton notes, “Officer-created jeopardy . . . includes the actions of officers 
who, without sound justification, willingly fail to take advantage of available tactical 
concepts like distance, cover, and concealment . . . , willingly abandon tactically 
advantageous positions by moving into disadvantaged positions without 
justification, or act precipitously on their own without waiting for available 
assistance from other officers.”4 If an officer is charged criminally or sued civilly 
for his use of force and the trier of fact is limited to considering only the moment 
when the officer used force and is not allowed to consider prior conduct of the officer 
that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation, the verdicts in such cases will be 
skewed from the start in favor of the officer.  
While a handful of legal scholars have addressed the problem of officer-
created jeopardy in the context of civil rights claims filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claiming excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment,5 this Article is one 
                                                            
politics/2015/12/tamir-rice-s-death-didn-t-lead-to-indictments-because-of-supreme-court-
vagueness-on-officer-created-jeopardy.html. 
4 SETH W. STOUGHTON, AT AL., EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE 158 (NYU Press 
2020). 
5 See, e.g., STOUGHTON, AT AL., EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE, supra note 4, at 155-
90 (discussing police tactics that can reduce the likelihood of officer-created jeopardy); 
Seth W. Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police 
Violence, 70 EMORY L.J. 521 (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript available on ssrn) (arguing 
that the Fourth Amendment is a flawed framework for regulating police violence and that 
state legislatures and police agencies should adopt their own rules for regulating police 
violence rather than simply following the constitutional standard); Brandon Garrett & Seth 
Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 292 (2017) (discussing 
results of an empirical study of the use of force policies of the 50 largest police agencies in 
the United States and arguing for a reasonable officer standard that takes into account the 
tactical training of police officers when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of 
force); Arthur H. Garrison, Criminal Culpability, Civil Liability, and Police Created 
Danger: Why and How the Fourth Amendment Provides Very Limited Protection from 
Police Use of Deadly Force, 28 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RIGHTS L.J. 241 (2018) (reviewing 
the federal circuit split over whether consideration of an officer’s pre-sizure conduct when 
assessing the reasonableness of that officer’s use of force is appropriate); Timothy P. Flynn 
& Robert J. Homant, Suicide by Police in Section 1983 Suits: Relevance of Police Tactics, 
77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 555 (2000) (describing the split in the circuits over the 
admissibility of pre-seizure conduct in the context of “suicide by police”); Michael Avery, 
Unreasonable Seizures of Unreasonable People: Defining the Totality of Circumstances 
Relevant to Assessing the Police Use of Force against Emotionally Disturbed People, 34 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261 (2003) (focusing on police interactions with emotionally 
disturbed individuals and arguing that courts should take into account the training available 
to and actually provided to the officers involved, accepted police practices, and the choices 
made by the officers leading up to the use of force as factors in the totality of the 
circumstances); see also Jack Zouhary, A Jedi Approach to Excessive Force Claims: May 
the Reasonable Force Be with You, 50 U. TOL. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that when 
determining whether an officer is liable for using excessive force, courts should consider 
pre-seizure police officer conduct if reckless and the proximate cause of the use of force); 
Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap: Untangling the Chain of Events in Excessive Force 
Claims, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2017) (discussing police excessive force cases through 
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of the first to focus on officer-created jeopardy in the context of state criminal 
prosecutions of law enforcement officers who claim their use of force was justified. 
Specifically, this Article examines whether the trier of fact in a state criminal 
prosecution should be permitted to broaden the time frame and consider conduct of 
the officer that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation as opposed to focusing 
narrowly on what the officer knew or believed at the moment the officer used deadly 
force. This Article argues that when the jury in a criminal prosecution of a law 
enforcement officer charged with a crime of violence is assessing the reasonableness 
of that law enforcement officer's use of deadly force, that jury should be allowed to 
consider all of the relevant surrounding circumstances, including conduct of the 
police that created or increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. 
State criminal courts are currently divided over whether juries should be 
permitted to consider the antecedent conduct of a police officer who has been 
charged with a crime arising out of the officer’s use of force. Very few state courts 
have addressed this issue in large part because there are so few criminal prosecutions 
of police officers.6 Because this question also arises in federal civil lawsuits filed 
                                                            
the lens of its disproportionate effect on young black men and women and arguing that 
officers should not be permitted to use force if they predictably created the need for such 
force by engaging in overly aggressive tactics); Kevin Cyr, Police Use of Force: Assessing 
Necessity and Proportionality, 53 ALBERTA L. REV. 663 (2016) (discussing officer-created 
jeopardy and its relevance to the necessity of police use of force in the Canadian legal 
system); Note, Ryan Hartzell C. Balisacan, Incorporating Police Provocation into the 
Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness" Calculus: A Proposed Post-Mendez Agenda, 54 
HAR. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIBS. L. REV. 327 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Los Angeles County v. Mendez and the circuit split over whether pre-seizure conduct 
may be considered by the trier of fact in a § 1983 civil rights action); Comment, Latasha   
M. James, Excessive Force: A Feasible Proximate Cause Approach, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 
605 (2020) (arguing that courts in § 1983 cases should incorporate an officer’s pre-seizure 
conduct into the reasonableness analysis and utilize tort law concepts of proximate 
causation to decide whether the officer’s pre-seizure conduct caused the use of force and 
the victim’s injuries); Note, Aaron Kimber, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable Seizure? 
The Relevance of an Officer's Pre-Seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 WM. 
& MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 651 (2004) (critiquing the Ninth Circuit’s now defunct 
provocation rule because it required an independent Fourth Amendment violation and 
supporting the Tenth Circuit’s “immediately connected to” test that allows consideration of 
pre-seizure police conduct that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation in § 1983 
lawsuits); Note, William Heinke, Deadly Force: Differing Approaches to Arrestee 
Excessive Force Claims, 26 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 155 (2017) (providing an 
overview of the different federal circuits’ approach to the question of whether pre-seizure 
police conduct may be considered by the trier of fact assessing the reasonableness of an 
officer’s use of force in a § 1983 case and arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should 
clarify its position and bring uniformity to the federal circuits). ] 
6 Approximately 1,000 individuals are shot and killed by police in the United States each 
year. Fatal Force, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2021). In the 15-year period between 2005 and 2020, however, only 121 
officers were charged with murder or manslaughter for deaths resulting from their on-duty 
use of force, according to data compiled by Philip M. Stinson, a criminal justice professor 
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against law enforcement officers for using excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 
19837—which holds public officials liable when they deprive individuals of their 
constitutional rights while acting under color of law—and in state civil tort cases 
against law enforcement officers for wrongful death, negligence, and assault and 
battery, it has significance beyond the state criminal prosecution context.  
In § 1983 civil rights cases, the issue of whether the fact finder can consider 
a law enforcement officer’s pre-seizure conduct has split the lower federal courts 
and is as yet unresolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.8 The Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to resolve this question in 2017, but explicitly declined to do so.9 
Similarly, state civil courts are split over whether the fact finder in a case involving 
a police officer accused of wrongful death, assault or battery or negligence must 
narrowly consider only the facts and circumstances at the moment of or right before 
the officer’s use of force or whether it may broaden the time frame and consider 
antecedent events and circumstances, including conduct of the officer that increased 
the risk of a deadly confrontation.  
This Article is primarily aimed at state legislators because they have the 
power to draft police use of force statutes that can specify whether the fact finder in 
a criminal prosecution of a police officer may consider conduct of the officer that 
increased the risk of a deadly confrontation in assessing the reasonableness of the 
officer’s beliefs or actions. Promisingly, in 2020, legislatures in two states and the 
District of Columbia enacted new use of force statutes specifying that the trier of 
fact must consider any conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
                                                            
at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Shaila Dewan, Few Police Officers Who Cause 
Deaths Are Charged or Convicted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/police-killings-prosecution-charges.html 
(https://perma.cc/LE45-MGC7). As of September 2020, only 44 of these officers had been 
successfully convicted—often of lesser charges. Id.  
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).   
8 A “seizure” of the person occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an 
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). In § 1983 civil rights cases, in which an officer 
is accused of violating an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, federal courts use the term “pre-seizure” to refer to 
events and circumstances that occurred before, not contemporaneous with, the moment that 
the officer used deadly force to stop an individual. See Estate of Robinson ex rel Irwin v. 
City of Madison, No. 15-cv-502, 2017 WL 564682, at *10 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 13, 2017) 
(describing an officer’s pre-seizure conduct as the “decisions and actions prior to the 
moment” the officer used deadly force); Rivera v. Heck, No. 16-cv-673, 2018 WL 
4354949, at *12 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 2018) (describing pre-seizure conduct as conduct 
“leading up to the use of force”).  
9 County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. ___, ___ n.*, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1547 n.* 
(2017) (“We did not grant certiorari on that question, and the decision below did not 
address it. Accordingly, we decline to address it here”).  
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confrontation.10 These new use of force statutes, which borrowed heavily from a 
model statute I proposed in 2018,11 also require the trier of fact to consider whether 
the officer engaged in de-escalation measures prior to using deadly force.12 
Additionally, the statutes augment the usual requirement in use of force statutes that 
a law enforcement officer must not use deadly force unless the officer reasonably 
believed it was immediately necessary to use such force to protect himself, herself, 
or another from death or serious physical injury, by making explicit that the officer’s 
actions must also have been reasonable.13  
This Article is secondarily aimed at state judges overseeing state criminal 
prosecutions of officers charged with crimes of violence arising from their use of 
deadly force. In the absence of a state use of force statute or a state appellate court 
decision that addresses this question, state trial court judges have the discretion to 
                                                            
10 On July 22, 2020, the District of Columbia became the first jurisdiction in the nation to 
enact a use of force statute requiring the trier of fact assessing the reasonableness of a law 
enforcement officer’s beliefs and actions to consider any conduct of the law enforcement 
officer that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation as part of the totality of the 
circumstances. 67 D.C. Reg. 9161 (July 31, 2020). The Comprehensive Policing and 
Justice Reform Second Emergency Amendment Act of 2020 was signed into law by Mayor 
Muriel Bowser on July 22, 2020 and enacted on a temporary basis. Nick Boykin, DC's 
Mayor Passes Police Reform Bill After Unanimous Council Vote, WUSA9 (July 22, 2020), 
https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/dc/washington-dc-police-bowser-passes-reform-
bill/65-65f4a9c5-d658-4744-b59d-929857d1914c (https://perma.cc/A3JT-EKXF). The 
D.C. Council will vote on whether to make this legislation permanent in the spring of 2021. 
Fenit Nirappil, D.C. Council Braces for Brawls Tuesday over Business Regulation, 
Criminal Justice Bills, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-council-2020-
bills/2020/11/30/3c536652-2a9b-11eb-9b14-ad872157ebc9_story.html. On July 31, 2020, 
Connecticut passed police reform legislation that included a similar provision. H.B. 6004, 
2020 Gen. Assemb., July Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22 (2020); 
Alex Snyder & Evan Simko-Bednarski, Connecticut Gov. Ned Lamont Signs Sweeping 
Police Reform Bill, CNN (July 31, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/31/us/connecticut-
police-reform-bill-signed/index.html. On October 28, 2020, Virginia Governor Ralph 
Northam signed police reform legislation that instructs the trier of fact assessing whether 
the use of deadly force was proper to consider “whether any conduct by the law 
enforcement officer prior to the use of deadly force intentionally increased the risk of a 
confrontation resulting in deadly force being used.” S.B. 5030, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Spec. 
Sess. I (Va. 2020); Adrianna Hargrove, Governor Northam Signs Laws Advancing Police, 
Criminal Justice Reform in Virginia, NBC12 (Oct. 28, 2020), 
https://www.nbc12.com/2020/10/28/gov-northam-signs-laws-advancing-police-criminal-
justice-reform-virginia/.  
11 See Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-escalation, 
Pre-seizure Conduct and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 661-65 
(explaining model use of force statute, key portions of which were adopted by Washington, 
DC, Connecticut and Virginia in 2020) [hereinafter Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use 
of Deadly Force]. 
12 See supra note 10.  
13 See supra note 10. 
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either allow or deny the jury’s consideration of conduct of the police that increased 
the risk of a deadly confrontation.  
To a lesser extent, this Article is also aimed at federal appellate judges in § 
1983 civil rights cases in which an officer is accused of using excessive force in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As discussed within, most of the federal circuit 
courts of appeal have already addressed this issue.14 While federal district court 
judges are constrained to follow appellate decisions in the controlling jurisdiction, 
federal circuit court judges can either follow or overrule their own existing precedent 
until the U.S. Supreme Court resolves this issue. Hopefully, this Article will 
convince federal circuit court judges in jurisdictions that have adopted a narrow time 
frame approach to reverse course and permit the jury to consider antecedent conduct 
of the officer that increases the risk of a deadly confrontation.  
 This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of 
the law on police use of deadly force. Part II examines how federal and state courts 
have answered the question of whether the trier of fact in a case involving an 
officer’s use of deadly force should be allowed to consider conduct of the police that 
increased the risk of a fatal confrontation. Part II starts by discussing the split in the 
lower federal courts on this question. Part II then examines what the U.S. Supreme 
Court said on this issue in its 2017 decision in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez.15 
Part II concludes by examining what the state courts in both the criminal and civil 
context have said on this issue. 
Part III sets forth the case for allowing juries to broaden the time frame and 
consider conduct of the police that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. This 
Part starts by introducing the reader to a theoretical construct by Mark Kelman that 
helps frame the issue at hand and illustrates the arbitrary nature of courts choosing 
either a narrow or a broad time frame. Next, Part III presents several arguments for 
allowing juries to consider antecedent conduct.  
First, in civilian homicide cases involving claims of self-defense, juries are 
allowed to consider the conduct of the defendant preceding the fatal confrontation 
that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation.16 In officer-involved shooting cases 
                                                            
14 See infra notes 89-122.  
15   581 U.S. ___; 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). 
16 Indeed, many states prohibit a civilian who is the initial aggressor in a conflict to assert a 
claim of self-defense. See, e.g., Castillo v. People, 421 P.3d 1141, 1148 (Colo. 2018) 
(noting that a person is not justified in using physical force if he is the “initial aggressor,” 
i.e., “the person who ‘initiated the physical conflict by using or threatening the imminent 
use of unlawful physical force’”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(3)(b) (2020) (barring use 
of justification defense by an individual who is the initial aggressor unless the individual 
withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates intent to withdraw to the other 
person); State v. Singleton, 974 A.2d 679, 697-98 (Conn. 2009) (finding no error where 
jury was instructed that initial aggressor is “the person who first acts in such a manner that 
creates a reasonable belief in another person’s mind that physical force is about to be used 
upon that other person” and that “[t]he first person to use physical force is not necessarily 
the initial aggressor”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(c) (2020) (barring use of justification 
defense by an initial aggressor with exception for withdrawal); State v. Hughes, 84 S.W.3d 
176, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (“A person who is an initial aggressor, that is, one who first 
attacks or threatens to attack another is not justified in using force to protect himself from 
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where the officer claims he acted justifiably to protect his own safety or the safety 
of another person, the officer is essentially making a claim of self-defense or defense 
of others. It thus makes sense to allow the jury to consider the officer-defendant’s 
antecedent conduct for the same reasons we allow juries in civilian self-defense 
cases to consider the civilian defendant’s pre-confrontation conduct.  
Second, in officer-involved shooting cases, the jury is allowed to consider 
the victim-suspect's antecedent conduct that led the officer to perceive a need to use 
deadly force. If the jury can consider the antecedent conduct of the victim-suspect 
that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation, it should be allowed to consider the 
antecedent conduct of the defendant-officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation as well.  
Third, in officer-involved shooting cases, the jury is allowed to consider 
conduct of the police that decreased the risk of a deadly confrontation. For example, 
if the officer called for backup, tried to calm the suspect, or used less deadly force 
prior to using deadly force, the jury would be allowed to consider the officer’s de-
escalation measures in assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s ultimate use of 
deadly force. If the jury can consider what the police did to decrease the risk of a 
deadly confrontation prior to using deadly force, it is only fair that the jury should 
be allowed to consider what the police did that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation.  
In addition, expanding the time frame to allow consideration of antecedent 
conduct makes sense because the jury assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s 
use of deadly force in an officer-involved shooting case is supposed to be 
considering the totality of the circumstances. If the officer did something to increase 
the risk of a deadly confrontation that the officer could have refrained from doing, 
this is simply one circumstance in the totality of the circumstances that is relevant 
to whether the officer’s overall conduct was reasonable.  
Part III concludes with an analysis of the possible objections to allowing the 
jury to consider antecedent conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation. Most objections to broadening the time frame are grounded in 
concerns about prejudice or relevance, but these arguments fail to consider the 
equalizing and probative value of such evidence.  
This Article does not focus on the very important issue of race and police 
use of force, an issue I have highlighted in other writings.17 Most of the studies that 
                                                            
the counter-attack that he provoked”); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2020) (barring self-
defense by an individual who was an initial aggressor with exceptions for withdrawal, 
physical force by law enforcement officers under the state use of force statute, or where 
otherwise permitted by statute); Conley v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d 756, 776 (Ky. 
2019) (holding that a defendant “must use physical force prior to any act of purported self-
protection” to be the initial aggressor); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.060 (3) (West 2020) 
(barring use of justification defense by an individual who was the initial aggressor with 
exceptions for withdrawal or use of nondeadly physical force where individual reasonably 
believes force being returned places the individual in “imminent danger of death or serious 
physical injury”). 
17 See Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with 
Martial Arts Training, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2016); Cynthia Lee, But I Thought 
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have been conducted on shooting and racial bias suggest that race has an influence 
on the decision to shoot.18 The bulk of the shooter bias studies show that both 
civilians and police officers are quicker to shoot at Black suspects than they are to 
shoot at White suspects and are less likely to shoot when the suspect is White than 
when the suspect is Black.19 Furthermore, both civilians and police officers have 
greater difficulty distinguishing a weapon from a harmless object when the person 
holding the object is Black.20 A few studies have found that officers are slower to 
shoot Black suspects than White suspects.21 Despite these latter findings, it is worth 
noting that “even if an officer’s actual split-second decision isn’t race dependent, 
the series of events that puts an officer in that position might well be.”22  
Currently, unless the legislature or a controlling appellate court has spoken 
on this issue, whether the jury can consider officer conduct prior to the officer’s use 
of deadly force rests entirely within the trial court's discretion.23 This can lead to 
                                                            
He Had a Gun: Race and Police Use of Deadly Force, 2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 
1 (2004). 
18 Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force, supra note 17, at 152-58.  
19 Id. (analyzing numerous shooter bias studies, the vast majority of which found that 
civilian or police officer participants were quicker to mistakenly shoot unarmed Black 
targets over unarmed White targets). It is interesting to note that police officers performed 
better than civilians in these shooter bias studies, most likely because law enforcement 
officers are trained in the use of force. Id. at 156, citing Joshua Correll et al., Across the 
Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J.  
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020 (2007) (finding that although police officers, 
like civilians, showed racial bias in their initial reactions to the various targets by 
recognizing that a target was armed more quickly when the target was Black than when the 
target was White, their ultimate shooting decisions were more accurate than those of 
civilians). 
20 Id. at 153, citing Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of 
Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 404 
(2003).  
21 Id. at 158, citing Lois James et al., Results from Experimental Trials Testing Participant 
Responses to White, Hispanic and Black Suspects in High-Fidelity Deadly Force Judgment 
and Decision-Making Simulations, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 189, 204 (2013); 
Lois James et al., Racial and Ethnic Bias in Decisions to Shoot Seen through a Stronger 
Lens: Experimental Results from High-Fidelity Laboratory Simulations, 10 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 323, 334–35 (2014); Lois James et al, The Reverse Racism 
Effect: Are Cops More Hesitant to Shoot Black Than White Suspects?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUBLIC POL’Y 457, 462 (2016). 
22 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 5, at 221. See also L. Song Richardson, Arrest 
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2011) (explaining 
how, because of implicit racial bias, an officer might evaluate behaviors engaged in by 
Blacks as suspicious when the same behaviors by Whites would not arouse the officer’s 
suspicions). 
23 See Greenridge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that a trial 
court’s decision to exclude evidence of an officer’s pre-seizure conduct is a procedural 
ruling subject only to review for abuse of discretion). If an appellate court has ruled on the 
issue, then the trial court must follow that ruling. As discussed within, the appellate courts 
are split on this issue. See infra text accompanying notes 89-122.  
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arbitrary and capricious results since the decision to expand or constrict the time 
frame may turn on the trial court’s general view of law enforcement. If the court is 
sympathetic to the law enforcement officer, it may be reluctant to allow the jury to 
consider the officer’s antecedent conduct, fearing that the jury will be more inclined 
to find against the officer if it hears about the antecedent conduct. If the court feels 
police officers are not usually held accountable for their actions but should be, the 
court may be more inclined to broaden the time frame and allow the fact finder to 
consider the officer’s antecedent conduct. To reduce the arbitrariness necessarily 
arising from this type of inconsistency, state legislatures should pass use of force 
statutes explicitly authorizing the fact finder in a state criminal prosecution of a law 
enforcement officer to consider antecedent police conduct that increased the risk of 
the encounter turning deadly.24 
 
I.  A QUICK PRIMER ON POLICE USE OF FORCE 
 
Police use of force in the United States is primarily governed by two lines 
of authority: (1) U.S. Supreme Court decisions on what counts as excessive force 
under the Fourth Amendment in civil rights lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, and (2) state use of force statutes, which specify the requirements for a law 
enforcement officer’s claim of justifiable force in a state criminal prosecution.25 
                                                            
24 See supra note 10. In passing use of force legislation requiring the trier of fact to 
consider whether any conduct of the officer increased the risk of a deadly confrontation, 
Washington, DC, Connecticut, and Virginia borrowed language from a model statute I 
proposed in 2018. See Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force, supra note 
11, at 664-65. 
25 State use of force statutes control in state criminal prosecutions of law enforcement 
officers claiming their use of force was justified. See Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, 
Police Use of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years After Garner, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 109, 125–26 (2015) (observing that states enjoy broad authority to establish standards 
for substantive criminal law, including criminal law defenses that address when a police 
officer’s use of force is justified, and U.S. Supreme Court case law cannot change a state’s 
substantive criminal law); Matthew Lippman, Criminal Procedure 442 (2d ed. 2014). In 
addition, state tort law governs in civil cases filed against police officers for wrongful death 
and assault and battery. Additionally, an officer can be prosecuted federally under 18 
U.S.C. § 242, a civil rights statute that prohibits a law enforcement officer acting under 
color of law from willfully depriving an individual of a right protected by the Constitution 
or the laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2018). The willfulness requirement in 
Section 242 makes it almost impossible to convict an officer charged under this statute. See 
Miranda Dalpiaz & Nancy Leong, Excessive Force and the Media, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 9 (2016) (noting that “[t]he willfulness standard requires the government to 
prove ‘a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right’ and that “[t]his heightened 
willfulness standard has made federal prosecution of section 242 cases ‘significantly more 
difficult’”); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 809 
(2000) (“There is strong evidence that the Screws interpretation of section 242's willfulness 
element has made federal prosecution of police misconduct cases significantly more 
difficult”). I discuss the U.S. Supreme Court case law on the meaning of “excessive force” 
under the Fourth Amendment in this brief overview because the Fourth Amendment is 
commonly regarded as the primary vehicle for the regulation of police uses of force. See 
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While there are many parallels between these two lines of authority, they are not one 
and the same. U.S. Supreme Court decisions control in § 1983 civil rights actions 
involving claims that a law enforcement officer used excessive force. State use of 
force statutes control in state criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers 
charged with murder, manslaughter, or any other crime of violence who claim 
justifiable force. An officer’s claim of justifiable force in a state criminal law 
prosecution is much like a civilian defendant’s claim of self-defense except state use 
of force statutes that outline the requirements for the law enforcement defense are 
generally more forgiving of police officers than self-defense statutes are to civilians. 
Most people assume that U.S. Supreme Court case law on police use of force 
controls in state criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers. While a state 
that does not have a use of force statute may follow U.S. Supreme Court case law 
on police use of force,26 in the vast majority of states that have enacted statutes on 
                                                            
Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 
supra note 5, at 523-24 (noting that the common wisdom is that the Fourth Amendment 
regulates all police uses of force when in fact, it only regulates uses of force that constitutes 
“seizures” of the person). 
26 If a state does not have a use of force statute, it may apply U.S. Supreme Court case law 
in its state criminal law prosecutions of law enforcement officers. For example, courts 
overseeing criminal prosecutions of police officers in Maryland, which currently has no use 
of force statute on its books, apply Graham v. Connor and other U.S. Supreme Court cases. 
See State v. Pagotto, 762 A.2d 97, 111-12 (Md. 2000) (noting that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ 
of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 
the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”), citing Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989); State v. Albrecht, 649 A.2d 336, 349 (Md. 1994) (noting that 
“when the accused is a police officer, the reasonableness of his conduct must be evaluated 
not from the perspective of a reasonable civilian but rather from the perspective of a 
reasonable police officer”), citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).  Courts in 
Ohio, which currently has no use of force statute, do the same. See State v. White, 29 
N.E.3d 939, 947 (Ohio 2015) (“Although the Supreme Court’s decisions in Garner and 
Graham involved an officer’s civil liability for deprivation of civil rights under color of 
law, these cases nonetheless help to define the circumstances in which the Fourth 
Amendment permits a police officer to use deadly and nondeadly force. Courts therefore 
apply Garner and Graham in reviewing criminal convictions arising from a police officer’s 
use of deadly force.”) Contrary to conventional wisdom, states without a use of force 
statute on the books do not have to follow Supreme Court case law on what constitutes 
excessive force in their criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers claiming they 
used justifiable force. See Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the 
Regulation of Police Violence, supra note 5 (arguing that states and police agencies should 
stop blindly incorporating Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on excessive force into their 
laws and regulations since the Fourth Amendment is a flawed mechanism for regulating 
police violence). States without a use of force statute can instead apply ordinary self-
defense doctrine in criminal prosecutions involving police officers charged with crimes of 
violence. See, e.g., Rankin v. Commonwealth, No. 1671-16-1, 2018 WL 1915538, at *4 n.6 
(Va. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2018) (noting that ordinary self-defense doctrine rather than 
Graham v. Connor applies in prosecution of law enforcement officer). For a list of states 
that did not have a use of force statute as of January 2021, see infra note 45. For a list of 
states that have incorporated U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence into state law, regardless of 
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police use of force, the use of force statute, enacted by the state legislature, is what 
controls in a state criminal law prosecution of a law enforcement officer who claims 
their use of force was justified. While there may be overlap between the two lines 
of authority, state use of force statutes can and, in many respects, do diverge from 
U.S. Supreme Court case law. Contrary to common belief, state use of force statutes 
that appear to contradict the holdings of U.S. Supreme Court case law on excessive 
force in the §1983 context are not unconstitutional by virtue of the fact that they 
diverge from Supreme Court case law.27  
 
A. Overview of U.S. Supreme Court Case Law on Police Use of 
Force  
 
The Supreme Court has issued many opinions on police use of force, but 
Graham v. Connor28 is its most cited authority on how courts should go about 
determining whether police use of force is excessive.29 In Graham v. Connor, an 
                                                            
whether they have a use of force law or not, see STOUGHTON, AT AL., EVALUATING POLICE 
USES OF FORCE, supra note 4, at 69-70. 
27 Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police Use of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years 
After Garner, 35 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 109, 121 (2015) (listing for example several 
states that retained the old common law rule that allowed police officers to use any amount 
of force, including deadly force, to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing felon even after the 
Supreme Court rejected the common law rule in Tennessee v. Garner). U.S. Supreme Court 
cases on excessive force govern in §1983 cases while state statutes govern in state 
prosecutions of police officers. Flanders & Welling, supra at 125-26 (explaining that 
“Garner involved the application of the standard within a federal civil rights statute, not in 
a state criminal prosecution”).  
28 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
29 Two other U.S. Supreme Court cases on police use of force are widely cited as well. 
Since I have written about these cases more extensively in prior scholarship, see Lee, 
Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force, supra note 11, at 641-42, 648-50, they 
are just summarized here. In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), a police officer shot 
an African American teenager in the back of the head while the teen was attempting to 
flee from a house that had been broken into even though the officer was pretty sure the 
teenager was unarmed. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court rejected the common 
law rule in effect in Tennessee at that time which permitted an officer to use whatever 
force was necessary, including deadly force, to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing felon. The 
Court held that only where the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a 
threat of serious bodily harm, either to the officer or others, is it constitutionally 
reasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Additionally, the Court suggest that 
the officer should give some warning prior to using deadly force, if feasible. Many read 
Tennessee v. Garner as establishing two bright line rules regarding police use of force: (1) 
police cannot use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon unless they have probable cause to 
believe the individual poses a threat of serious bodily harm to the officer or others, and 
(2) the officer should give a warning, if feasible, prior to using deadly force against a 
fleeing felon. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), Victor Harris, an African American 
who was rendered a quadriplegic after a police officer rammed his patrol car into the back 
of Harris’ car, causing it to crash, sued the officer, arguing that the officer’s actions were 
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African American man with diabetes was handcuffed, shoved against the hood of 
his car after he asked the officers to check his wallet for a diabetes decal he carried, 
then thrown headfirst into the patrol car.30 Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts on 
his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and a loud ringing in his right 
ear.31 He brought a lawsuit against the officers involved in the incident, alleging they 
used excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights.32  
The district court applied a four-factor subjective test based on the Due 
Process Clause and granted the officers’ motion for a directed verdict, finding that 
the amount of force the officers used on Graham was appropriate under the 
circumstances.33 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that 
in relying on the four-factor test and applying the Due Process Clause, the district 
court applied the correct legal standard to assess the appropriateness of the officers’ 
use of force.34 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the lower courts erred 
in applying the Due Process Clause to assess Graham’s claim.35 The Court held that 
all civilian claims of excessive force by a law enforcement officer must be analyzed 
for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause.36  
According to Graham v. Connor, in assessing reasonableness, courts should 
balance the individual’s interests against the governmental interests and pay careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of the case.37 Furthermore, the standard of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is an objective standard; an officer’s 
actual intent is irrelevant.38 “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must 
be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 
the twenty-twenty vision of hindsight.”39 An officer does not have to be correct in 
his assessment of the need to use force; she can be mistaken as long as her mistake 
                                                            
not reasonable since the officer did not have probable cause to believe Harris posed a 
threat of serious bodily injury to the officer or others as required under Tennessee v. 
Garner. The high-speed chase had taken place at night and there were very few cars on 
the road. The Supreme Court rejected Harris’ attempt to have the Court follow its own 
precedent, explaining that Tennessee v. Garner was simply an application of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness balancing and did not set forth a bright-line rule for police 
officers contemplating the use of deadly force against a fleeing felon. Id. at 382. 
30 490 U.S. 386, 389 (1989). 
31 Id. at 390. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 390-91 (noting that the district court considered the following four factors in 
assessing whether the officers used excessive force against Graham: (1) the need for 
application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that 
was used, (3) the extent of injury inflicted, and (4) whether the force was applied in a good 
faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or whether it was applied maliciously and 
sadistically for the purpose of causing harm). 
34 Id. at 391. 
35 Id. at 388. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 396-97. 
38 Id. at 399. 
39 Id. at 396. 
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was reasonable.40 Additionally, “proper application [of reasonableness balancing] 
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, 
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”41 In other words, reasonableness balancing 
is a totality of the circumstances test. Graham v. Connor is understood as the current 
standard for assessing claims of excessive force. 
As Rachel Harmon and others have noted, a significant problem with the 
Graham v. Connor standard is that it fails to provide meaningful guidance to lower 
courts, litigants, and police officers in the field.42 This has led to inconsistency in 
the application of the Graham standard. For example, lower courts are split over the 
question whether the jury may consider whether less deadly alternatives that could 
have avoided the deadly conflict were available to the officer but not taken.43 Lower 
                                                            
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Rachel Harmon, one of the Assistant Reporters to the American Law Institute’s current 
Policing Project, observes:  
Graham permits courts to consider any circumstance in determining 
whether force is reasonable without providing a standard for measuring 
relevance, it gives little instruction on how to weigh certain factors, and it 
apparently requires courts to consider the severity of the underlying 
crime in all cases, a circumstance that is sometimes irrelevant and 
misleading in determining whether force is reasonable.  
Rachel Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1120 
(2008). See also Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of 
Police Violence, supra note 5, at 545-56. To be fair, the Court explicitly stated that the trier 
of fact should consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. These factors, however, are obviously 
relevant and would probably be considered by the trier of fact even if the Court had not 
specified that they should be considered.  
43 Some courts view the availability of less deadly alternatives as irrelevant to the 
reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force. See, e.g., Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 
649 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Alternative measures which 20/20 hindsight reveal to be less 
intrusive (or more prudent), such as waiting for a supervisor or the SWAT team, are simply 
not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.”); Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (“We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even 
a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable . . . .”); United 
States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994) (“We must avoid 
‘unrealistic second-guessing’ of police officers' decisions . . . and thus do not require them 
to use the least intrusive means in the course of a detention, only reasonable ones.”)]. Other 
courts recognize that whether less deadly alternatives were available to the officer but not 
used is a relevant factor in deciding whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable. 
Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Whether listed in 
Graham,] [o]ther relevant factors include the availability of less intrusive alternatives to the 
force employed . . . .”); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
“the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect may be a factor 
to consider” in determining whether a particular application of force was unreasonable); 
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courts are also split over whether juries should be allowed to consider antecedent 
conduct of the officer that contributed to the risk of the encounter turning deadly.44   
 
B. Overview of State Use of Force Statutes  
 
The vast majority of state statutes on police use of force allow an officer to 
use deadly force against a civilian if the officer reasonably believed deadly force 
was necessary to effectuate an arrest, prevent the escape of a felon, or protect the 
officer or others.45 Only a few states allow an officer to use deadly force based solely 
on the officer’s honest belief that deadly force was necessary without also requiring 
                                                            
Estate of Heenan v. City of Madison, 111 F. Supp. 3d 929, 942 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (“The 
failure to use an alternative, non-deadly force is not dispositive, although whether such an 
alternative existed is a factual question that may weigh on a trier of facts’ ultimate 
determination of objective reasonableness.”) (emphasis in original). 
44  See infra text accompanying notes 89-122 and 187-200.  
45 It appears that as of November 2020, twenty-nine states utilize “reasonable belief” 
language in their use of force statute, requiring only that the officer reasonable believed 
that deadly force was necessary and not explicitly requiring a finding of reasonable action 
by the law enforcement officer as well. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27(b) (2020); ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.81.370(a) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-410(C) (2020); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-2-610(b) (2020); CAL. PENAL Code § 835a(c)(1) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1-707(4.5) (2020); FLA. STAT. § 776.05(3) (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20(b) (2020); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-5 (2020); IOWA CODE § 804.8(1)(b) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
21-5227(a) (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(A) (2020); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 
107(2) (2020); MINN. STAT. § 609.066(2) (2020); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.046(3) (2020); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. § 627:5(II) (2020); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-7(b)(2) (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1) (McKinney 2020); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(d)(2)(a–b) (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 732(2) (2020); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 161.239 (2020); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-7-8, 12-7-9 (2020); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 9.51 (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-404 (West 2020); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9A.16.040(4) (2020). Three states (Delaware, Kentucky, and Nebraska) utilize a 
subjective belief standard. DEL. CRIM. CODE tit. 11, § 467(c) (2020); KY. PENAL CODE § 
503.090(2) (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412(3) (2020). Four states (Mississippi, 
Nevada, North Dakota, and South Dakota) do not reference the officer’s belief in their use 
of deadly force statute. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.140 
(2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-32 (2020). 
Four states (Idaho, Indiana, New Mexico, and Tennessee) require probable cause before an 
officer can justifiably use deadly force. IDAHO CODE § 18-4011 (2020); IND. CODE § 35-
41-3-3 (2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-620 (2020). 
At least two states and the District of Columbia require both reasonable beliefs and action 
before an officer can justifiably use deadly force. See supra note 24. As of January 2021, 
seven states (Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming) still did not have a use of force statute. Maryland was presented with several 
use of force bills in 2019 and again in 2020, but these bills failed to make it out of 
committee. H.B. 1121, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019); H.B. 166, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020); 
H.B. 1090, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020).  
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that the officer’s belief was objectively reasonable.46 In focusing on whether the 
officer honestly or reasonably believed in the need to use deadly force and not 
                                                            
46 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 467(c) (2020) (authorizing deadly force where all 
other reasonable means have been exhausted, and the officer believes that the arrest is for a 
crime involving actual or threatened physical injury, that there is no substantial risk of third 
party injury, and that delayed apprehension will cause a substantial risk of death or serious 
injury) (emphasis added); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.090 (West 2020) (authorizing deadly 
force where an officer arrests someone for a felony involving actual or threatened use of 
deadly force and believes that the arrestee is likely to “endanger human life unless 
apprehended without delay”) (emphasis added). Similarly, Nebraska’s use of force statute 
provides that a police officer is justified in using deadly force if the officer is arresting 
someone for a felony and believes the force employed involves no substantial risk of injury 
to innocents, and either (1) the crime of arrest involved the use or threat of deadly force, or 
(2) there is a substantial risk that the arrestee will cause death or serious bodily injury if 
apprehension is delayed. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412(3) (2020) (emphasis added). Some 
legal scholars have argued that even though it appears to embrace a subjective belief 
standard, Nebraska’s use of force statute in fact utilizes an objective reasonable belief 
standard. See, e.g., STOUGHTON, AT AL., EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE, supra note 
4, at 78, citing State v. Thompson, 244 Neb. 189, 505 N.W.2d 673 (1993); Wagner v. City 
of Omaha, 236 Neb. 843, 464 N.W.2d 175 (1991). The case law, however, does not 
explicitly state that the officer’s belief must be a reasonable belief. It merely states that the 
force used by an officer, i.e., the officer’s actions, must be reasonable. See State v. 
Thompson, 505 N.W.2d 673, 680 (1993) (citing Wagner v. City of Omaha for the 
proposition that “under the provisions of § 28-1412, a police officer in making an arrest 
must use only reasonable force, which is that amount of force which an ordinary, prudent, 
and intelligent person with the knowledge and in the situation of the arresting police officer 
would have deemed necessary under the circum-stances”) (emphasis added); Wagner v. 
City of Omaha, 236 Neb. 843, 464 N.W.2d 175 (1991) (holding that “under the provisions 
of Â§ 28-1412, a police officer in making an arrest must use only reasonable force, which 
is that amount of force which an ordinary, prudent, and intelligent person with the 
knowledge and in the situation of the arresting police officer would have deemed necessary 
under the circumstances”) (emphasis added). There is a big difference between only 
requiring that an officer’s belief in the need to use deadly force be reasonable, as most use 
of force statutes do, versus requiring that an officer’s beliefs and actions be reasonable, as 
is now required in only a handful of jurisdictions. See infra note 10.; Lee, Reforming the 
Law on Police Use of Deadly Force, supra note 11, at 637, 639, 655 (discussing model use 
of force statute which would require both a reasonable belief and reasonable action). Some 
use-of-force statutes appear to adopt a subjective standard by using the word "believes," 
but have been interpreted as utilizing an objective, reasonable belief standard. See also, 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-307(3) (2020) ("The use of deadly force is not justifiable under 
this section unless: [t]he arrest is for a felony; [and t]he person effecting the arrest is 
authorized to act as a law enforcement officer . . . [and t]he actor believes that the force 
employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and [t]he actor believes 
that: [t]he crimes for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or 
threatened use of deadly force; or [t]here is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested 
will cause death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed.") (emphasis 
added); id. § 703-300 ("'Believes' means reasonably believes.”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
508(a) (2015) ("[A peace officer] is justified in using deadly force only when he believes 
that such force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or such 
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requiring a separate finding that the officer’s actions were reasonable, the vast 
majority of state use of force statutes encourage the trier of fact to focus on whether 
the officer’s fear of the suspect was reasonable. 
Prior to 2020, none of the state use of force statutes on the books separately 
required consideration of whether the officer’s acts were reasonable. In 2020, two 
states and the District of Columbia passed use of force legislation disallowing the 
use of deadly force unless both the officer’s beliefs and actions were reasonable.47 
Under current law in the vast majority of the states, the officer has a huge 
advantage. This is because when the jury is told that all they need to think about is 
whether the officer’s belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable, the jury 
will focus its attention on what the suspect or victim of the officer’s use of force was 
doing. Did the individual have a gun? Was that person reaching for their waistband? 
Was the person resisting arrest? These are all relevant questions that help the jury 
differentiate between reasonable and unreasonable beliefs about the need to use 
deadly force, but the ultimate question in all of these cases, whether implicit or 
explicit, is whether the officer’s actual use of force was reasonable. Use of force 
                                                            
other person, or when he believes both that: such force is necessary to prevent the arrest 
from being defeated by resistance or escape; and the person to be arrested has committed or 
attempted a forcible felony or is attempting to escape and possesses a deadly weapon, or 
otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict serious bodily injury unless 
arrested without delay.") (emphasis added); id. § 501 ("'Believes' or 'belief.' Means 
'reasonably believes' or 'reasonable belief.'”). The state of Washington previously used a 
subjective belief standard in its police use of deadly force statute. See WASH. REV. CODE § 
9A.16.040(3) (2015) (“A public officer or peace officer shall not be held criminally liable 
for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is justifiable 
pursuant to this section.”). In 2019, the state of Washington rewrote subsection 4 to 
§9A.16.040, explaining that “good faith” reflects an objective standard rather than a 
subjective standard. Subsection 4 now provides, “A peace officer shall not be held 
criminally liable for using deadly force in good faith, where “good faith” is an objective 
standard which shall consider all the facts, circumstances, and information known to the 
officer at the time to determine whether a similarly situated reasonable officer would have 
believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious physical 
harm to the officer or another individual.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(4) (2020).  
47 See supra note 24. In addition, Vermont enacted a new use of force statute in 2020 that 
requires a finding that the officer’s use of deadly force was reasonable but does not also 
require a finding that the officer’s beliefs were reasonable. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 
2368 (2020). On December 31, 2020, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed a 
comprehensive police reform bill that includes use of force provisions. See 
https://www.mass.gov/news/governor-baker-signs-police-reform-legislation; 
https://www.nbcboston.com/massachusetts/gov-baker-signs-revised-mass-police-reform-
bill/2269498/. Massachusetts’s new use of force statute, like Vermont’s, does not examine 
the officer’s beliefs. It requires that an officer attempt de-escalation tactics, if feasible, prior 
to using any force and provides that deadly force may not be used unless “necessary to 
prevent imminent harm to a person and the amount of force used is proportionate to the 
threat of imminent harm.” 2020 Mass. Acts ch. 253.  
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statutes should explicitly direct the jury to consider whether the actions of the officer 
were reasonable.48 
 
II. OFFICER-CREATED JEOPARDY 
 
Situations in which the unwise decisions or actions of the police create or 
increase the risk of a deadly confrontation have been called “officer-created 
jeopardy.”49 As described by one legal scholar, “Officer-created jeopardy is, in 
essence, a manner of describing unjustified risk-taking that can result in an officer 
using force to protect themselves from a threat that they were, in part, responsible 
for creating.”50 
A critically important question that arises in cases involving officer-created 
jeopardy is whether the jury should focus only on the facts and circumstances known 
to the officer at the moment when the officer used deadly force or whether it should 
be allowed to consider any facts or circumstances relevant to the reasonableness of 
the officer’s use of force, including conduct of the officer that may have created or 
increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. In other words, is a narrow time framing 
                                                            
48 See Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force, supra note 11 (proposing 
model use of force statute requiring a finding that the officer’s beliefs and actions were 
reasonable for law enforcement use of deadly force to be justified). 
49 STOUGHTON, ET AL., EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE, supra note 4, at 156 (noting 
that “‘[o]fficer-created jeopardy” refers to situations in which officers affirmatively create 
or passively accept unjustifiable risks or threats that could have, and should have, been 
avoided”); Steve Ijames, Managing Officer Created Jeopardy, POLICE1 (July 26, 2005), 
https://www.police1.com/archive/articles/managing-officer-created-jeopardy-
t4w1PZChSkzfdf84/ (discussing ways to manage and reduce the risk of officer-created 
jeopardy situations); Kevin Cyr, Police Use of Force: Assessing Necessity and 
Proportionality, 53 ALBERTA L. REV. 663, 668 (2016) (describing “officer-created 
jeopardy” as “where an officer takes unnecessary action which then creates a situation that 
requires force to resolve” and as “a risk created by inappropriate police action that 
unreasonably deviates from established strategy and doctrine”) (emphasis in original); 
Jeffrey J. Noble & Geoffrey P. Alpert, State-Created Danger: Should Police Officers Be 
Accountable for Reckless Tactical Decision Making?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
POLICING 567, 569 (Dunham & Alpert eds. 2015) (“[u]nsound decisions in the fact of 
predictable violent behavior sometimes set a series of events into motion that can result in 
tragedy”) (emphasis added); Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Death Resulted from “Officer-
Created Jeopardy.” So Why Were No Other Officers Indicted?, SLATE (Dec. 28, 2015), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/12/tamir-rice-s-death-didn-t-lead-to-indictments-
because-of-supreme-court-vagueness-on-officer-created-jeopardy.html (explaining that 
“officer-created jeopardy” refers to “situations in which police officers are responsible for 
needlessly putting themselves in danger, committing an unforced tactical error that makes 
them vulnerable—and then using deadly force to protect themselves”) (emphasis added). 
As Seth Stoughton notes, “There are many situations in which officers create or accept a 
certain degree of risk or threat, but that do not constitute officer-created jeopardy because 
the officer’s actions are justified under the circumstances.” STOUGHTON, EVALUATING 
POLICE USES OF FORCE, supra note 4, at 156-57 (noting that “culpability is inherent in the 
concept of officer-created jeopardy”). 
50 STOUGHTON, EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE, supra note 4, at 157.  
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approach appropriate in cases where an officer’s pre-shooting conduct may have 
created or increased the risk that the officer would need to use deadly force or should 
courts adopt a broad timing approach? 
Several scholars have addressed this question, primarily in the context of § 
1983 litigation and how the federal courts have understood what the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on “excessive force” under the Fourth Amendment.51 This 
Article builds upon the existing scholarship but adds an examination of this question 
in the context of state criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers whose use 
of force has killed or seriously injured a civilian. This Article challenges the 
conventional wisdom that the states must follow the U.S. Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts when deciding what constitutes excessive police force. Contrary to 
popular belief, states enjoy broad authority in crafting their use of force statutes and 
need not follow federal civil rights jurisprudence.  
Seth Stoughton, a former police officer and now a law professor at the 
University of South Carolina, is one of the leading voices critiquing the narrow time 
framing approach embraced by a number of federal courts in the § 1983 context. In 
his recently published book, Evaluating Police Uses of Force, with Jeffrey Noble 
and Geoffrey Alpert, Stoughton and his co-authors note that “[a]n officer’s use-of-
force decision . . . will almost always be affected by events that occur prior to use of 
force itself, and often prior to the subject’s noncompliance, resistance, or other 
physical actions upon which the use of force is immediately predicated.”52 They also 
argue that holding that “an officer’s conduct prior to the use of force—what has been 
referred to as ‘pre-seizure conduct’—is not properly part of the analysis . . . is not 
only self-defeating, it also runs counter to the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment 
that meaningful review ‘requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case.’”53  
In A Tactical Fourth Amendment, Brandon Garrett, another leading expert 
on police use of force, and Seth Stoughton observe that a narrow time framing 
approach, under which the possibility that the officer may have contributed to the 
creation of the dangerous situation is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis,54 
unwisely ignores the fact that sound tactical police training focuses on giving the 
officer time to make decisions from a position of safety.55 They point out that a 
decision made early in an encounter, when there is less time pressure, can avoid 
putting officers into a position in which they have to make a time-pressured 
decision.56 Sound police tactics, such as increasing the distance between the officers 
                                                            
51 See supra note 5. 
52 STOUGHTON, EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE, supra note 4, at 227. 
53 Id. See also Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police 
Violence, supra note 5, at 556-59 (critiquing those federal courts that have adopted a 
narrow “final frame” approach to the question of the admissibility of pre-seizure conduct 
and pointing out that such an approach has become one-sided, allowing consideration of 
the subject’s precipitating behaviors but ignoring the officer’s antecedent conduct that 
increased the risk of an encounter turning deadly). 
54 Garrett & Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 223. 
55 Id. at 219. 
56 Id. at 259. 
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and a suspect and taking cover behind a physical object that protects an officer from 
a particular threat, can give officers more time to analyze the situation and thus 
reduce the risk to officers and the subject.57 In contrast, “a [p]oor tactical decision, 
such as stepping in front of a moving vehicle, can deprive the officer of time in 
which to safely make a decision about how to act, forcing the officer to make a seat-
of-the-pants decision about how to respond.”58 Garrett and Stoughton argue that the 
training that an officer has had and the training that a reasonable officer would have 
received should be considered relevant circumstances in the Fourth Amendment 
totality of the circumstances analysis59 and that constitutional reasonableness should 
be grounded in police tactics.60  
In The Violent Police-Citizen Encounter, Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf 
observe that “[a] police ‘decision’ to use, or not to use, deadly force in a given 
context might be better described as a contingent sequence of decisions and resulting 
behaviors—each increasing or decreasing the probability of an eventual use of 
deadly force.”61 “The officer, who, for example, encounters an armed robber in a 
store and immediately takes cover while calling for backup support, will greatly alter 
the probability of the incident resulting in a shooting.”62 Binder and Scharf 
recommend that we think of the police encounter as involving four phases: 
“anticipation, entry, information exchange, and the final decision that leads to an act 
of violence.”63 They note that “early decisions by officers may either prolong or 
curtail each of the four phases. For example, by seeking cover early in a 
confrontation, an officer can afford to engage in a more prolonged information 
exchange with an opponent than another officer without similar protection.”64 
In A Theory of Excessive Force and Its Control,65 Carl Klockars provides 
examples to illustrate how an officer’s unwise conduct can increase the risk of 
deadly force needing to be used later in an encounter. In one example, police receive 
a call about a group of teenage boys with guns.66 Two officers, in separate vehicles, 
respond to the call.67 One of the officers brings a shotgun to the site.68 The officers 
find two male teens engaged in sexual intercourse inside the shack.69 The officers 
                                                            
57 Id. at 260-61. 
58 Id. at 259. 
59 Id. at 299. 
60 Id. at 303. 
61 Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf, The Violent Police-Citizen Encounter, 452 THE ANNALS 
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 111, 116 (1980). [Nick – 
I’m not sure how this should be cited. Can you put it into BB citation format for me?] 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 118. 
65 Carl B. Klockars, A Theory of Excessive Force and Its Control in POLICE VIOLENCE: 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 1-23 (Geller & Toch ed. 
1996). 
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order the boys to get dressed.70 As soon as the boys are dressed, one officer tries to 
handcuff them.71 Both boys try to run.72 One officer grabs one of the fleeing teens, 
forces him to the ground, then proceeds to handcuff him.73 The other officer knocks 
the second teen to the ground with a blow to the ribs with the barrel of his shotgun.74  
Klockars explains that that the second officer’s bringing a shotgun to the 
scene was not something a well-trained officer would have done because carrying a 
shotgun “severely compromises the officer’s ability to use minimal and intermediate 
levels of force.”75 Klockars explains that “[a]n  officer with a shotgun in his hands 
is of almost no help in grabbing, restraining, or handcuffing; he or she is seriously 
compromised in any apprehension that involves a foot pursuit; and, for all practical 
purposes, he or she surrenders the option to use a baton.”76 Klockars concludes that 
in light of the nature of the complaint, “bringing a shotgun was a mistake because it 
limited the officer carrying it to using a degree of force that was too severe under 
the circumstances.”77 He also notes that the officer’s decision to use the shotgun as 
an impact weapon risked the possibility of an accidental discharge and that a skilled 
police officer in that situation would have left the boy run by.78 The other teen could 
have identified his friend and even if he refused to do so, it would not be difficult to 
figure out his identity and taken into custody at a later time.79 
In Police Shootings: Is Accountability the Enemy of Prevention, Barbara 
Armacost also critiques approaches that focus narrowly on the moment that the 
police officer used deadly force.80 She argues that we should look beyond that 
narrow time frame and try to figure out the root causes that contributed to the police 
shooting, identifying possible preventive measures that can be taken at the systems 
level to prevent tragic shootings in the future.81 She uses the Tamir Rice to illustrate 
how legal experts asked to analyze that case applied a narrow time frame and ignored 
antecedent police conduct that increased the risk that the encounter would result in 
the use of deadly force.82 
While there is some disagreement about how to qualitatively determine 
which pre-seizure conduct ought to be considered, all of the scholarly writing on the 
subject appears to be in agreement that a broad time frame that takes into account 











80 Barbara Armacost, Police Shootings: Is Accountability the Enemy of Prevention?, 80 
OHIO STATE L.J. 907, 911 (2019). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 965 (noting that “both experts applied a very narrow timeframe—the exact moment 
of the shooting”), 968 (identifying the failure of the officers to communicate their location 
to the dispatcher and the failure to communicate with other police officers in the area as 
conduct, or lack thereof, that increased the need to use deadly force). 
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pre-seizure police conduct is more appropriate than a narrow time frame that 
excludes such conduct from the jury’s consideration at trial.83 Despite the near 
consensus in the scholarly community that a broad time frame is more appropriate 
than a narrow time frame, the federal courts are split as to whether the jury in a § 
1983 civil rights action where a law enforcement officer is accused of using 
excessive force may consider “pre-seizure”84 conduct of the officer that contributed 
to the risk of a deadly confrontation or whether the jury must limit their 
consideration to the moment that the officer used force against the individual. Some 
federal courts have held that an officer’s pre-seizure conduct is irrelevant to the 
question of whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable or excessive and cannot 
                                                            
83 See supra note 5. 
84 The term “pre-seizure” in this context refers to conduct of the police that occurs prior to 
the time that the individual civilian was "seized" by a police officer’s use of force within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an 
individual is "seized" when an officer accosts that individual and restrains his freedom to 
walk away either by physical force or show of authority. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 
16 (1968) (“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has 
occurred”). As a general matter, if a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or 
terminate the encounter with the police, the individual has not been "seized." United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). But see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 
(1991) (noting that since the defendant’s “freedom of movement was restricted by a factor 
independent of police conduct—i.e., by his being a passenger on the bus[,] . . . the 
appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer’s 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”). Questions abound about whether an 
individual has been seized in cases involving an officer's show of authority because an 
individual must submit to that officer's show of authority in order to be seized. California v. 
Hodari D. 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (noting that “[t]he word ‘seizure’ readily bears the 
meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, 
even when it is ultimately unsuccessful [but] does not remotely apply . . . to the prospect of 
a policeman yelling ‘Stop, in the name of the law!’ at a fleeing form that continues to 
flee”). An attempted seizure is not a seizure. Id. at 626 n. 2. For a seizure to have occurred, 
the officer must have had the intent to stop the individual’s freedom of movement. Brower 
v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (noting that “a Fourth Amendment seizure 
does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual’s 
freedom of movement . . . nor even whenever there is a governmentally caused and 
governmentally desired termination of an individual’s freedom of movement . . ., but only 
when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied”) (emphasis in original). It is generally assumed that one who has 
been shot and killed by an officer who intended to shoot the individual has been seized 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. On October 14, 2020, the U.S. Supreme 
Court heard oral argument in Torres v. Madrid to consider whether physical force applied 
to an individual must be successful at detaining that individual to constitute a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Kristin Doyan, Supreme Court 
Considers Fourth Amendment Seizure, Deportation Due to Fraud, JURIST (Oct. 15, 2020) ( 
12:47:42 PM), https://www.jurist.org/news/2020/10/supreme-court-considers-fourth-
amendment-seizure-deportation-due-to-fraud/; Torres v. Madrid, 769 F. App’x 654 (10th 
Cir. 2019), cert. granted 140 S. Ct. 680 (2019). As of the time of the writing of this Article, 
the Court had not yet issued a decision in this case. 
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be considered by the jury.85 Other courts have held that the officer’s pre-seizure 
conduct is just one factor in the totality of the circumstances that the jury should be 
permitted to weigh and consider when assessing the overall reasonableness of the 
officer’s use of force.86  
The state courts have not as robustly addressed this issue as the federal 
courts. In the civil context, the less than a dozen state courts that have addressed the 
time framing issue are split. In the criminal context, only two states have addressed 
the issue. These states have found that antecedent conduct is not relevant and should 
not be considered by the jury. 
This Part first examines the split in the lower federal courts on this question. 
It then discusses the closest case on point by the U.S. Supreme Court, County of Los 
Angeles v. Mendez.87 In Mendez, the Court had the opportunity to settle the question 
whether the jury can consider the antecedent conduct of the officer but declined to 
do so. Instead, the Court ruled much more narrowly, striking down the Ninth 
Circuit’s provocation rule, a rule that no other Circuit had embraced, leaving open 
the question of whether the officer’s antecedent conduct can be considered by the 
jury in a case involving a claim of excessive force by the police.88 Finally, this Part 
examines how the state courts have addressed the issue of whether the trier of fact 
should be able to broaden the time frame and consider antecedent conduct of the 
police that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation.  
 
A. Federal Circuit Court Split Over Whether Fact Finder May 
Consider Pre-Seizure Conduct of the Officer  
 
 Whether an officer’s pre-seizure conduct may be considered by the fact 
finder in a § 1983 civil rights action assessing whether a law enforcement officer’s 
use of force was reasonable or excessive is an important question that has almost 
evenly split the federal circuits.  Six federal courts of appeal—the Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits—do not allow consideration of pre-seizure 
conduct, finding such conduct irrelevant to the reasonableness of an officers use of 
deadly force.89 These courts take the position that when assessing whether an 
                                                            
85 See text accompanying notes 89-98. 
86 See text accompanying notes 105-122. 
87 581 U.S. ___; 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).  
88 See text accompanying note 156. 
89 Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Officer Proulx’s actions leading up to 
the shooting are irrelevant to the objective reasonableness of his conduct at the moment he 
decided to employ deadly force”); Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 234 n.16 (2d Cir. 
2014) (“In cases [where the officer’s prior conduct may have contributed to later need to 
use force], courts in this Circuit and others have discarded evidence of prior negligence or 
procedural violations, focusing instead on ‘the split-second decision to employ deadly 
force.’”); Greenridge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that events 
which occurred before the seizure “are not relevant and are inadmissible”); Fraire v. City of 
Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiffs’ suggestion that 
officer’s use of force was excessive because he “manufactured the circumstances that gave 
rise to the fatal shooting” by failing to display his badge and identify himself while in plain 
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officer’s use of force was unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the fact finder’s focus should be on the moment of the seizure, i.e., the 
moment that the officer decided to use deadly force, not on events prior to or leading 
up to the seizure.90  
 
 a. Federal Circuits That Have Adopted a Narrow Time Frame 
 
The federal circuit courts that limit the jury’s consideration to the moment 
of the seizure have primarily relied on language in the Supreme Court’s Graham v. 
Connor decision to validate their position. For example, in Greenridge v. Ruffin,91 
the Fourth Circuit considered the appellant’s argument that the district court erred 
in excluding evidence of the officer’s actions leading up to the time immediately 
before the arrest.92 In rejecting this argument,93 the court pointed out that the 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor instructed “that the ‘reasonableness’ of an 
officer’s particular use of force ‘must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight’ [and] that 
‘reasonableness’ meant the ‘standard of reasonableness at the moment,’ and that 
                                                            
clothes, which were violations of police procedure, and noting that even if the officer 
negligently departed from established police procedure, this would not mean the officer’s 
use of force was excessive); Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 992-93 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ request that the court “examine the circumstances surrounding the 
forced entry, which may have led to the fatal shooting,” and noting that “[t]he excessive 
force inquiry is confined to whether the [officer or another person] was in danger at the 
moment of the threat  that resulted in the  [officer’s use of deadly force]” and concluding 
that the court “need not look at any other moment in time”), citing Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. 
Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 493 (5th Cir. 2001); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 
1151, 1162 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n reviewing the plaintiffs' excessive force claim, we limit 
the scope of our inquiry to the moments preceding the shooting”); Carter v. Buscher, 973 
F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992) (“pre-seizure conduct is not subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny”); Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994) (“we judge 
the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew” at the 
point when the subject charged at him” and do not “return to the prior segments of the 
event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were 
correct"); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining that because 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or ill-advised 
conduct in general[,] . . . we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events leading to the 
seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment”); Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643 
(8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the district court erred in excluding 
evidence that the actions of the officers preceding the seizure created the need to use force, 
noting that “Appellant’s argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court case law”), quoting 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (“With respect to a claim of excessive force, the [ ] 
standard of reasonableness at the moment applies”).  
90 See cases cited supra note 89.  
91 927 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1991). 
92 Id.at 791. 
93 Id. at 792 (noting that “events which occurred before Officer Ruffin opened the car door 
and identified herself to the passengers are not probative of the reasonableness of Ruffin’s 
decision to fire the shot”). 
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‘[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary 
in a particular situation.”94 This explanation, however, ignores that the Supreme 
Court also made clear in Graham that the jury should pay careful attention to the 
facts and circumstances of each particular case when assessing the reasonableness 
of an officer’s use of force.95 In other words, the Court directed the jury to consider 
the totality of the circumstances.96 
Other courts embracing the narrow view have explained that because the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures by police as opposed to 
unreasonable police conduct in general, the only thing that matters in a § 1983 case 
is whether the seizure itself is unreasonable, not whether conduct of the officer 
leading up to the seizure was unreasonable. In Cole v. Bone,97 for example, the 
Eighth Circuit noted that the issue at hand was whether the officers unreasonably 
seized the deceased in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and because “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or ill-advised 
conduct in general . . ., we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events leading 
up to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”98 This 
explanation, however, does not acknowledge that the officer’s decisions and conduct 
leading up to the seizure may be very relevant to the reasonableness of that officer’s 
use of deadly force. 
Confusingly, some courts in the jurisdictions that require the jury to focus 
on the moments right before the officer’s use of deadly force, have also stated that 
the jury should be allowed to consider events leading up to the seizure and draw 
reasonable inferences from those events.99 These courts seem to want to have it both 
ways, not allowing the jury to consider pre-seizure conduct of the officer that 
increased the risk of a deadly confrontation but allowing the jury to consider other 
pre-seizure events and circumstance, such as the victim’s conduct that may have led 
                                                            
94 Id. at 791-92 (emphasis in the original). 
95 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396. 
96 Id., citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9 (the question is "whether the totality of 
the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . . seizure"). 
97 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993). 
98 Id.at 1332-33. 
99 For example, in Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated that “[t]he excessive force inquiry is confined to whether the Trooper was in 
danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in the Trooper’s shooting Bazan,” while 
also stating that events that occurred before the Trooper chased the victim into a field 
“could affect the outcome of the case” in light of the fact that the Trooper’s account of what 
transpired between him and the victim during that time was different from what two 
eyewitnesses said transpired. 246 F.3d 481, 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in the original). 
Similarly, in Estate of Williams v. Indiana State Police Dep’t, the Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged that the rule of law in the jurisdiction was that conduct of the officer leading 
up to the seizure could not itself be the basis for Fourth Amendment liability. 797 F.3d 468, 
483 (7th Cir. 2015). In the very next paragraph, however, the court stated that “the sequence 
of events leading up to the seizure is relevant because the reasonableness of the seizure is 
evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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the officers to believe the victim posed a deadly threat or de-escalation measures 
taken by the police that decreased the risk of a deadly confrontation.100 Along these 
lines, some courts in the jurisdictions that view pre-seizure conduct of the officer as 
irrelevant have adopted a segmented approach, splitting the police-civilian 
encounter into segments and evaluating the reasonableness of an office’s conduct 
during each segment.101  
Limiting the facts and circumstances that may be considered by the trier of 
fact assessing the overall reasonableness of an officer’s use of force to those 
available to the officer at the moment when force was applied by the officer is 
misguided. As Seth Stoughton, a former police officer who is now a law professor 
and an expert on police use of force, notes:  
This approach fails to recognize what legal scholars, criminologists, and 
police practitioners have concluded without exception: an officer’s 
approach, actions, and decisions can affect the probability and severity of 
an ultimate use of force. The way an officer interacts with someone, for 
example, can potentially provoke or prevent resistance. In the same vein, 
poor tactics can expose the officer to physical danger that a different 
approach is likely to avoid, increasing the likelihood that the officer will use 
force to address that danger.102 
Stoughton points out that the fact that an officer’s interactions can provoke 
resistance is well known in policing circles, and that police departments have 
developed tactics specifically designed to reduce the risk that an encounter with a 
suspect will turn into a deadly confrontation.103 He also notes that “[a]s a purely 
descriptive matter, almost every incident of police violence is the ultimate result of 
‘a contingent sequence of decisions and resulting behaviors—each increasing or 
decreasing the probability of an eventual use of . . . force,’ including officers’ 
decisions and behaviors.”104 
 
                                                            
100 In Gardner v. Buerger, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
True, unreasonable police behavior before a shooting does not necessarily make 
the shooting unconstitutional; we focus on the seizure itself—here, the shooting—
and not on the events leading up to it. But this does not mean we should refuse to 
let juries draw reasonable inferences from evidence about events surrounding and 
leading up to the seizure. 
82 F.3d 248, 253 (8th Cir. 1996), cited with approval in Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 
762 (8th Cir. 2008). 
101 Garrett & Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 292.  
102 Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 
supra note 5, at 557–58.  
103 Id. at 558 (noting “[t]hese observations are well known in policing: over at least the last 
fifty years, the industry has developed a range of tactics—that is, procedures and 
techniques intended to help ‘limit the suspect’s ability to inflict harm and advance the 
ability of the officer to conclude the situation in the safest and least intrusive way’—that 
apply in specific situations (e.g., traffic stops, domestic disputes, and active shooter 
scenarios), as well as tactical principles that can be applied whenever the situation 
permits”). 
104 Id. 
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 b. Federal Circuits That Have Adopted the Broad Time Frame 
 
Five federal courts of appeal—the First, Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits—permit the jury in a § 1983 civil rights action to consider pre-seizure 
events, including police officer conduct that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation, when assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force.105 
                                                            
105 See, e.g., St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1995) (“We first reject 
defendants' analysis that the police officers' actions need be examined for "reasonableness" 
under the Fourth Amendment only at the moment of the shooting… [O]nce it has been 
established that a seizure has occurred, the court should examine the actions of the 
government officials leading up to the seizure.”); Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 
22 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that “the [trial] court did not abuse its discretion in instructing 
the jury that 'events leading up to the shooting' could be considered by it in determining the 
excessive force question”); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 1999) ("we want 
to express our disagreement with those courts which have held that analysis of 
‘reasonableness’ under the Fourth Amendment requires excluding any evidence of events 
preceding the actual 'seizure'"); Brown v. City of Hialeah, 30 F.3d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 
1994) (finding district court erred in prohibiting trier of fact from considering police 
officer’s use of a racial slur in assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force 
during arrest); Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
“[s]ometimes . . . officers themselves may ‘unnecessarily creat[e] [their] own sense of 
urgency’" and that “[r]easonable triers of fact can, taking the totality of the circumstances 
into account, conclude that an officer’s poor judgment or lack of preparedness caused him 
or her to act unreasonably.”); Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 
2018) (“[T]he events leading up to the shooting, including the officers tactics, are 
encompassed in the facts and circumstances for the reasonableness analysis.”). At one time, 
the Tenth Circuit precluded consideration of pre-seizure conduct. Bella v. Chamberlin, 24 
F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1994) (“we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events 
leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment”). In 1995, the 
Tenth Circuit reversed course and allowed consideration of pre-seizure conduct but limited 
such consideration to an officer’s intentional or reckless conduct immediately connected 
with the use of force. Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The 
reasonableness of [the officers’] actions depends both on whether the officers were in 
danger at the precise moment that they used force and on whether Defendants' own 
reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such 
force”), citing Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Obviously, 
events immediately connected with the actual seizure are taken into account in determining 
whether the seizure is reasonable.”); Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(“In addition to considering whether the officers reasonably believed they were in danger at 
the time they used force, we have considered ‘whether [the officers'] own reckless or 
deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such force.’ An 
officer’s conduct before the suspect threatens force is therefore relevant provided it is 
‘immediately connected’ to the seizure and the threat of force.”). The Tenth Circuit did not 
follow the Ninth Circuit in requiring that the officer’s conduct provoked the violent 
confrontation and constituted an independent violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even 
after the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Mendez, see infra notes 127-162, the Tenth 
Circuit has continued to allow consideration of pre-seizure officer conduct. See Estate of 
Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 2019) (“The district court . . . correctly 
recognized that ‘[t]he reasonableness of the use of force depends not only on whether the 
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These courts, also relying on language from the Supreme Court, reason that the jury 
assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force in a §1983 case is supposed 
to consider all the facts and circumstances, and conduct of the officer that increased 
the risk of a deadly confrontation is simply one fact or circumstance in the totality 
of the circumstances.  
For example, in Young v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano,106 the First 
Circuit rejected the officers’ argument that the verdict against them should be 
overturned because of the erroneous admission of evidence that one of the officer’s 
left cover.107 The court explained that “once it is clear that a seizure has occurred, 
‘the court should examine the actions of the government officials leading up to the 
seizure’” not “solely at the ‘moment of the shooting.’”108 The court explained that 
this reasoning was most consistent with the Supreme Court’s totality of the 
circumstances approach.109  
Similarly, in St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia,110 the First Circuit rejected the 
argument that in a § 1983 action, the trier of fact assessing the reasonableness of the 
officer’s actions should be limited to the moment of the shooting.111 The court noted 
that in Brower v. Inyo,112 the U.S. Supreme Court “held that once it has been 
established that a seizure has occurred, the court should examine the actions of the 
government officials leading up to the seizure.”113 
Another rationale put forth in support of allowing consideration of pre-
seizure conduct is that an assessment of the reasonableness of an officer’s use of 
deadly force necessarily requires consideration of pre-seizure events. Moreover, 
once a court allows some pre-seizure events to be considered, there is no principled 
way to draw the line between pre-seizure events that may be considered by the jury 
and pre-seizure events that must be excluded from the jury’s consideration. As the 
Third Circuit noted in Abraham v. Raso:114 “How is the reasonableness of a bullet 
striking someone to be assessed if not by examining preceding events?”115 The court 
continued:  
Do you include what [the officer] saw when she squeezed the 
trigger? Under at least some interpretations of Hodari, [the 
decedent] evidently was not seized until after the bullet left the 
                                                            
officers were in danger at the precise moment they used force but also on whether the 
officers’ own conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such force. 
However, only reckless and deliberate conduct that is ‘immediately connected to the 
seizure will be considered.’”). 
106 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005). 
107 Id.at 22. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (“This rule is most consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate that we consider 
these cases in the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”), citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 
8-9 (1985), Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396. 
110 71 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995). 
111 Id. at 26. 
112 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
113 City of Laconia, 490 U.S. at 26. 
114 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999). 
115 Id.at 291. 
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barrel and actually struck him. If we accept both this interpretation 
of Hodari as well as the rule that pre-seizure conduct is irrelevant, 
then virtually every shooting would appear unjustified, for we 
would be unable to supply any rationale for the officer’s conduct.  
 
Courts that disregard pre-seizure conduct no doubt think they could 
avoid this problem. But even rejecting the rigorous interpretation of 
Hodari, courts are left without any principled way of explaining 
when ‘pre-seizure’ events start and, consequently, will not have any 
defensible justification for why conduct prior to that chosen 
moment should be excluded.116  
The Third Circuit was careful to note that it was “not saying that all 
preceding events are equally important, or even of any importance.”117 The court 
explained, “Some events may have too attenuated a connection to the officer’s use 
of force.”118 It then continued, “But what makes those prior events of no 
consequence are ordinary ideas of causation, not doctrine about when the seizure 
occurred.”119  
Prior to 2017, the Ninth Circuit permitted consideration of an officer’s 
antecedent conduct but only under certain circumstances.120 Under what was known 
as the provocation rule, the Ninth Circuit permitted consideration of an officer’s pre-
seizure conduct but only if such conduct was intentional or reckless, constituted an 
independent violation of the Fourth Amendment, and provoked the violent 
confrontation.121  The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule directed that such pre-seizure 
conduct would render an otherwise reasonable use of force unreasonable.122  
 In allowing consideration of some pre-seizure conduct, the Ninth Circuit’s 
provocation rule was better than a rule precluding any consideration whatsoever of 
pre-seizure conduct.  The Ninth’s Circuit’s provocation rule, however, was too 
restrictive in limiting the kinds of pre-seizure conduct that could be considered. Only 
an officer’s intentional or reckless conduct that constituted an independent Fourth 
Amendment violation could serve as the basis for liability. If an officer engaged in 
negligent pre-seizure conduct, i.e., conduct that a reasonable officer would not have 
taken, that unreasonable conduct could not be considered by the fact finder assessing 
the overall reasonableness of the officer’s action. If an officer violated police 
                                                            
116 Id. at 291-92. 
117 Id. at 292.  
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 In Billington v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit held that “where an officer intentionally or 
recklessly provoke[s] a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth 
Amendment violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly 
force.” 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002). As explained below, in 2017, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule violated the Fourth 
Amendment. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. ___; 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).  
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
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protocol by failing to call for backup, such pre-seizure conduct could not be 
considered unless it constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.123  
 The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule was too restrictive in another way.  Not 
only did it limit the types of pre-seizure conduct that could be considered, it also 
limited the fact finder’s discretion by mandating a finding that an officer’s use of 
deadly force was unreasonable if it was the result of an intentional or reckless 
violation of the Fourth Amendment that created the risk of a violent confrontation.124 
A better rule would have allowed consideration of pre-seizure conduct without 
directing the jury to find that an officer’s use of force is always unreasonable 
whenever intentional or reckless pre-seizure conduct that violates the Fourth 
Amendment is present.  An officer’s pre-seizure conduct should just be one factor 
among many other factors that can be considered by the fact finder assessing the 
reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force but should not predetermine the 
liability question. 
The D.C. Circuit has not taken a clear position on whether pre-seizure 
conduct may be considered in assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of 
force in a § 1983 action. Nonetheless, in reviewing a state criminal prosecution of a 
police officer charged with assault, the D.C. Circuit held that the jury should be 
allowed to consider all of the surrounding circumstances leading up to the use of 
force.125 Given that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force is at issue in both 
state criminal prosecutions of officers charged with crimes of violence and § 1983 
actions, it is likely that the D.C. Circuit would take the same position in a § 1983 
action. Thus, if one counts D.C. as a jurisdiction that permits the jury to consider 
pre-seizure conduct of the officer, there is an even 6-6 split in the circuits over 
whether the jury may consider pre-seizure conduct of the officer when assessing the 
reasonableness of the officer’s use of force. 
  
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Position on Whether Pre-Seizure 
Conduct May Be Considered by the Trier of Fact 
 
                                                            
123 Aaron Kimber raises a similar point, arguing that requiring a separate Fourth 
Amendment violation is arbitrary and "severely limits the instances in which a plaintiff will 
be able to use pre-seizure police conduct." Kimber, supra note 5, at 665.  
124 In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the U.S. Supreme Court raised another concern, 
critiquing the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule for its reliance on the subjective intent of the 
officer because the Fourth Amendment standard it has set forth is one of objective 
reasonableness. 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548 (noting that “while the reasonableness of a search or 
seizure is almost always based on objective factors, the provocation rule looks to the 
subjective intent of the officers who carried out the seizure”). 
125 Barrett v. United States, 64 F.2d 148, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1933). In reversing a police 
officer’s conviction for an assault effectuated during an arrest, the D.C. Circuit held that 
the lower court erred in “restrict[ing] the inquiry of the jury to the occasion of the arrest 
and ignor[ing] precedent circumstances.” Id. The court noted that the jury should have been 
instructed that they could “take into consideration every circumstance leading up to and 
surrounding the arrest . . .” Id. 
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 Prior to 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court had hinted in dicta that it did not 
consider pre-seizure conduct of an officer relevant to the officer’s use of force.126 
On May 30, 2017, the Supreme Court issued a decision in County of Los Angeles v. 
Mendez, a case implicating questions about whether an officer’s pre-seizure conduct 
can be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s use of deadly 
force.127  
 On October 1, 2010, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Department Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer Pederson shot two 
individuals, Angel Mendez and Jennifer Garcia (now Jennifer Mendez), his pregnant 
common law wife, fifteen times.128  Deputies Conley and Pederson were part of a 
team of twelve officers responding to a tip that a parolee-at-large named Ronnie 
O’Dell had been spotted riding a bicycle in front of a home owned by a Paula 
Hughes.129  
Deputies Conley and Pederson were directed to clear the rear of the property 
for officer safety and cover the back door in case O’Dell tried to escape out the 
back.130 They were told that a male named Angel lived in the backyard of the Hughes 
residence with a pregnant lady.131 Deputy Conley claimed he did not hear this 
announcement.132   
 The two deputies went to the rear of the Hughes’ property where they saw 
a shack.133 Without knocking and identifying themselves as law enforcement 
officers, Deputy Conley opened the door to the shack and pulled back a blue blanket 
used as a curtain to insulate the shack.134 Upon seeing “the silhouette of an adult 
                                                            
126 See City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1777 
(2015) (noting that “so long as ‘a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct 
was justified,’ a plaintiff cannot ‘avoi[d] summary judgment by simply producing an 
expert’s report that an officer’s conduct leading up to a deadly confrontation was 
imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless”), citing  Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 
1180 (9th Cir. 2002). 
127 County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. ___; 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). But see 
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), which some courts have cited as support 
for the proposition that the Supreme Court has allowed pre-seizure conduct of the police to 
be considered in analyzing the reasonableness of a seizure. For example, in Abraham v. 
Raso, the Third Circuit noted, “The Supreme Court has allowed events prior to a seizure to 
be considered in analyzing the reasonableness of the seizure.” 183 F.3d 279, 292 (3d Cir. 
1999), citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 599 (a case in which the decedent’s estate argued that 
police creation of a roadblock was designed in a way likely to kill). The court explained, “if 
preceding conduct could not be considered, remand in Brower would have been pointless, 
for the only basis for saying the seizure was unreasonable was the police’s preseizure 
planning and conduct.” Id. 
128 Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 115099 *2 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (Finding of Fact 1, 130 & 131).  
129 Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, 815 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2016).  
130 Id. at 1185.  
131 Id at 1184.  
132 Id at 1185.  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
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male holding what appeared to be a rifle pointed at them,” Deputy Conley yelled, 
“Gun!” and both deputies started shooting.135 A total of fifteen shots were fired.136   
 It turns out the man in the shack was not the target of the investigation but 
was Angel Mendez, a high school friend of Paula Hughes.137 Hughes had allowed 
Mendez to build a shack in her backyard and live in it with his common law wife.138 
Mendez was not holding a rifle, but a BB gun he kept to shoot rats that entered the 
shack.139 When Deputy Conley opened the door to the shack, Mendez was in the 
process of moving the BB gun so he could sit up in bed.140 
Mr. and Mrs. Mendez were both injured by the shooting.141 Mr. Mendez 
required amputation of his right leg below the knee.142 Mrs. Mendez, who was 
pregnant at the time, was shot in the back.143   
 The Mendezes sued the County of Los Angeles and Deputies Conley and 
Pederson, alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.144 After a bench 
trial, the district court found two Fourth Amendment violations: (1) the warrantless 
entry into the shack, and (2) the failure to knock and identify themselves as law 
enforcement officers prior to entering the shack.145 The district court also found that 
given Deputy Conley’s reasonable but mistaken belief that Mendez was pointing a 
rifle at him, the officers did not use excessive force in shooting the Mendezes but 
nonetheless concluded that the officers were liable for the shooting under the Ninth 
Circuit’s provocation rule.146 The district court awarded the Mendezes $4 million.147  
The Ninth Circuit upheld the $4 million damages award, agreeing with the 
district court’s finding that the warrantless entry into the shack was in clear violation 
of the Fourth Amendment because it was not supported by exigent circumstances or 
any other exception to the warrant requirement.148 The Ninth Circuit also agreed 
with the district court’s finding that the officers violated the knock and announce 
rule by failing to knock and identify themselves prior to entering the shack.149 
However, because it found that the law in the Ninth Circuit was not clearly 
established regarding whether police officers who have knocked and announced at 
the door to the main residence must also knock and announce before entering another 
residence on the curtilage,150 the court held that the deputies were entitled to 
                                                            
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 1185 n.2. 
139 Id. at 1185.  
140 Id.  
141 Id. at 1186.  
142 Id.  
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 1189.  
147 Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra 
note 128, at *98. 
148 815 F.3d at 1188-92.  
149 Id. at 1191. 
150 Id.  
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qualified immunity on the knock and announce claim.151 Additionally, the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the district court that liability was appropriate in this case even 
without relying on the provocation theory because the officers’ warrantless entry 
proximately caused the ensuing injuries.152  
The officers petitioned the Supreme Court, seeking to reverse the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling. The main issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was the 
constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, under which an officer 
could be held liable for an otherwise justifiable use of deadly force if the officer 
intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent confrontation through an independent 
Fourth Amendment violation.153 Because the provocation rule allowed consideration 
of an officer’s pre-seizure conduct in assessing the reasonableness of that officer’s 
later use of deadly force, the case presented the Court with the opportunity to resolve 
the question that had split the lower courts—whether the trier of fact in a § 1983 
case should be allowed to consider the pre-seizure conduct of an officer when 
assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force—once and for all. 
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule was 
inconsistent with the Court’s excessive force jurisprudence.154 While there is 
language in the opinion that appears critical of a broad time frame,155 instead of 
directly addressing the time framing question that has split the lower courts, the 
Court ducked that issue, stating in a footnote: 
Respondents do not attempt to defend the provocation rule. Instead, they 
argue that the judgment below should be affirmed under Graham itself. 
Graham commands that an officer’s use of force be assessed for 
reasonableness under the “totality of the circumstances.” On respondent’s 
view, that means taking into account unreasonable police conduct prior to 
the use of force that foreseeably created the need to use it. We did not grant 
certiorari on that question, and the decision below did not address it. 
Accordingly, we decline to address it here. . . . All we hold today is that once 
a use of force is deemed reasonable under Graham, it may not be found 
unreasonable by reference to some separate constitutional violation.156  
                                                            
151 Id. at 1192-93.  
152 Id. at 1194. 
153 County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1543 (2017) (framing 
the issue before it as follows: “If law enforcement officers make a ‘seizure’ of a person 
using force that is judged to be reasonable based on a consideration of the circumstances 
relevant to that determination, may the officers nevertheless be held liable for injuries 
caused by the seizure on the ground that they committed a separate Fourth Amendment 
violation that contributed to their need to use force?”). 
154 Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1543-44, 1547.  
155 Id. at 1546-47 (“Excessive force claims . . . are evaluated for objective reasonableness 
based upon the information the officers had when the conduct occurred.”), and 1547 
(noting the that problem with the provocation rule is that “it instructs courts to look back in 
time to see if there was a different Fourth Amendment violation that is somehow tied to the 
eventual use of force” and allows “[t]hat distinct violation, rather than the forceful seizure, 
[to] serve as the foundation of the plaintiff’s excessive force claim”). 
156 Id. at 1547 n.* (emphasis in original). 
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By leaving the time framing issue unresolved, the Mendez Court may have 
done those favoring a broad view of the totality of the circumstances a favor. Instead 
of prohibiting lower courts from allowing jury consideration of pre-seizure police 
conduct, the Court gave lower federal courts permission to decide on their own 
whether to adopt a narrow or broad time frame. 
The Mendez Court also suggested that lower courts might resolve the issue 
of the admissibility of an officer’s pre-seizure conduct by utilizing proximate 
causation analysis. It noted that the court below had held that “even without relying 
on [the] provocation theory, the deputies are liable for the shooting under basic 
notions of proximate cause.”157 The Supreme Court chided the Court of Appeals for 
focusing solely on the risks associated with the failure to knock and announce, for 
which the officers had qualified immunity, and suggested that, on remand, the Court 
of Appeals should “revisit the question whether proximate cause permits 
respondents to recover damages for their shooting injuries based on the deputies’ 
failure to secure a warrant at the outset.”158 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit found that the deputies’ unlawful entry 
without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, was the proximate cause of 
both the shooting and the subsequent injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.159 The court 
separately held that the officers were negligent under California law.160 The court 
again affirmed the district court’s original holding that the officers were liable for 
violations of the Mendezes’ Fourth Amendment rights.161 The officers sought 
redress in the Supreme Court again, but this time, the Court let stand the $4 million 
verdict against the officers.162 
 
C. State Cases on Whether Pre-shooting Conduct of the Officer 
May Be Considered When Assessing the Reasonableness of an 
Officer’s Use of Deadly Force 
 
As noted above, approximately half of the federal appellate courts hearing 
appeals from § 1983 cases alleging excessive force by law enforcement officers have 
disallowed consideration of pre-seizure conduct of the officer and the other half have 
allowed such consideration.163 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that whatever 
the federal courts have done in the § 1983 context applies in the state civil and 
criminal context, it is not necessary for state courts evaluating polices uses of force 
                                                            
157 Id. at 1548, citing 815 F.3d at 1194. 
158 Id. at 1549. 
159 Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2018). 
160 Id. at 1082. 
161 Id. at 1084.  
162 David G. Savage, Supreme Court Lets Stand $4-Million Verdict Against L.A. County 
Deputies in Shooting, L.A. TIMES (March 4, 2019) (9:35 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-supreme-court-police-shooting-los-angeles-
20190304-story.html (https://perma.cc/2CHQ-4HRD). 
163 See supra text accompanying notes 89 - 125. 
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to follow what the federal courts have said about what constitutes the appropriate 
time frame.164  
State courts presiding over both criminal prosecutions of law enforcement 
officers and civil cases involving individuals suing police officers in tort are not 
bound by the decisions in § 1983 cases but may choose to adopt their own standards 
in state criminal prosecutions and civil proceedings. In a § 1983 case when the issue 
is whether the officer’s use of force was excessive and in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the critical question is whether the officer’s use of deadly force to seize 
the individual was reasonable or excessive. Thus, while ultimately unpersuasive, 
there is some logic to the claim that the relevant time frame is the moment of the 
seizure. Whether or not a Fourth Amendment seizure of the person occurred and if 
so, whether that seizure was reasonable, however, is not the issue when an officer is 
being prosecuted for a crime or sued civilly in a private lawsuit under state tort law. 
Instead, the issue in a state criminal or civil case in which an officer claims his use 
of force was justified is whether the officer complied with the state’s requirements 
for the use of force or self-defense, requirements that have nothing to do with 
whether a Fourth Amendment seizure of the person occurred or whether that seizure 
was reasonable. 
In How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police 
Violence, Seth Stoughton urges “state lawmakers and administrative policymakers 
[to] divorce statutory and administrative regulatory mechanisms from constitutional 
law.”165 Stoughton points out that, contrary to common belief, the Fourth 
Amendment is not the only standard for regulating police violence.166 This is 
because the Fourth Amendment regulates seizures, and not all uses of force 
constitute “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.167 Stoughton 
notes that “[t]he interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment . . . are both 
distinct, and, in many cases, readily distinguishable from the interests that underlie 
state law and agency policy.”168 As an example, Stoughton notes that the California 
Supreme Court “has held that the concept of ‘reasonableness’ is narrower in the 
context of state negligence law than it is in the constitutional context, such that an 
                                                            
164 For example, both of the policing experts hired by the prosecutor in the Tamir Rice case 
confined their analysis to federal constitutional law, presumably because they thought 
federal constitutional law controlled the question of whether or not the officer who shot 
Rice had engaged in criminal conduct. Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 5, at 214. 
165 Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 
supra note 5, at 578.  
166 Id. at 578–79. 
167 Id. at 579 
168 Id. Similarly, as a Kansas court of appeals noted: 
[The] standard for a § 1983 claim based on a Fourth Amendment violation has no 
direct bearing on a claim for common-law battery under state law. They are two 
different legal claims or theories of liability, even though they may arise from a 
shared set of facts.”  
Estate of Randolph v. City of Wichita, 459 P.3d 802, 819 (Kan. 2020).  
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officer’s action that is considered ‘reasonable’ for Fourth Amendment purposes may 
be unreasonable as a matter of state law.”169  
This Part examines the state court response to the question of whether to 
broaden or narrow the time frame when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s 
use of force. It starts by examining how the state courts have dealt with this issue in 
the criminal context and then examines how the state courts have dealt with this 
issue in the civil context.170 
 
1. State Criminal Cases on Whether Antecedent Conduct of a Police 
Officer Defendant May Be Considered by the Trier of Fact 
 
Surprisingly, there is a dearth of state authority on whether antecedent or 
pre-shooting conduct by a law enforcement officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation may be considered by the trier of fact in a criminal prosecution 
assessing the reasonableness of that officer’s use of deadly force. Only two states, 
neither of which has a use of force statute on the books,171 have directly addressed 
this issue.172 A handful of others have indirectly addressed this issue.173 The paucity 
                                                            
169 Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 
supra note 5, at 580, citing Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 57 Cal.4th 622, 639 (2013).  
170 In civil tort actions brought by civilians against police officers, state tort law doctrines 
generally control. See Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 253-54 (Cal. 2013) 
(holding under state negligence law that tort liability can result from unreasonable use of 
deadly force by a law enforcement officer); Estate of Randolph v. City of Wichita, 459 
P.3d 802, 819 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that the “standard for a § 1983 claim based on 
a Fourth Amendment violation has no direct bearing on a claim for common-law battery 
[against a police officer] under state law” and that “the State, acting through its Legislature, 
defines the liability of its agents for common-law torts”). Some states follow federal 
constitutional case law in civil tort actions brought by civilians against police officers. See 
Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000) (applying Graham v. Connor to 
plaintiff’s battery, gross negligence, and state constitutional claims); Wasserman v. 
Bartholomew, 38 P.3d 1162, 1169-70 (Alaska 2002) (affirming analysis of plaintiffs’ state 
law claims under the Graham “objective reasonableness” standard); Hayes v. City of 
Columbus, No. 13AP-695, 2014 WL 2048176, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 15, 2014) 
(applying Graham v. Connor to defendant officer’s claim of statutory immunity under state 
law). 
171 See Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force, supra note 11, at 654 n. 
180 (listing states that previously had no use of force statute). As noted in this Article, the 
District of Columbia, Virginia, and Massachusetts, jurisdictions that previously had no use 
of force statute, enacted use of force legislation in 2020. See supra notes 10 and 47. 
172 See infra text accompanying notes 177-182 (Maryland) and 184-186 (Ohio). 
173 While not directly ruling on this issue, some courts appear amenable to allowing juries 
in criminal prosecutions involving a police officer defendant to consider the officer’s 
antecedent conduct in assessing the officer’s culpability. In People v. Pote, for example, a 
police officer was charged with murder and a jury found him guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter. 326 N.E.2d 236 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1975). In affirming the defendant 
officer’s conviction, the intermediate court of appeals noted that “[the officer’s] behavior 
and the circumstances under which it occurred—including the presence of a crowd of 
civilians and policemen, the fact that defendant had fired his gun previously, and the 
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of case law in this arena is likely due to the fact that very few officers are prosecuted 
for their uses of force.174 
Maryland is one of two states that has directly addressed the time framing 
issue and has taken the position that antecedent conduct of a law enforcement officer 
may not be considered by the trier of fact in a criminal case in assessing the 
reasonableness of that officer’s use of force.175 In Pagotto v. State,176 a police 
officer’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment in 
connection with an incident in which the officer accidentally shot and killed the 
driver of a Subaru vehicle during a traffic stop were reversed in large part because 
the appellate court rejected the State’s attempt to show that the officer’s pre-shooting 
conduct increased the risk of a deadly confrontation.177  
To prove the officer acted with gross criminal negligence, the mental state 
required for involuntary manslaughter, and simple recklessness, the mental state 
required for reckless endangerment, the prosecutor argued that three antecedent 
actions of Sergeant Pagotto increased the risk that his service weapon would be 
accidentally discharged: (1) approaching the victim’s car with his service weapon 
drawn, (2) grappling with the driver with his left hand while his gun was in his right 
                                                            
warning by his fellow officer not to continue shooting—support a finding that defendant 
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that someone would be 
seriously injured or killed.” Id. at 746. Similarly, in Couture v. Commonwealth, a Virginia 
Court of Appeals suggested that if an officer creates the perception of danger and this 
renders his perception unreasonable or his use of force excessive, then that officer would 
not be entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense because he would not be justified in 
using deadly force to defend himself. 656 S.E.2d 425, 428-29 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (noting 
that “[t]o the extent [the officer’s] responsibility for ‘creating the perception of danger,’ as 
the jury put it, rendered his perception unreasonable or his use of force excessive, then the 
privilege to defend himself with deadly force would not be available”).  
174 Zusha Elinson & Joe Palazzolo, Police Rarely Criminally Charged for On-Duty 
Shootings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:22PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/police-
rarely-criminally-charged-for-on-duty-shootings-1416874955 (https://perma.cc/UQ8K-
37M2) (“Police are rarely charged criminally for on-duty shootings”). See also Shaila 
Dewan, Few Police Officers Who Cause Deaths Are Charged or Convicted, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/police-killings-prosecution-
charges.html (https://perma.cc/LE45-MGC7) (“Few police officers are ever charged with 
murder or manslaughter when they cause a death in the line of duty, and only about a third 
of those officers are convicted”).  
175 Maryland state courts do allow consideration of the defendant’s antecedent conduct in 
homicide cases involving ordinary civilians even though they do not allow such 
consideration in homicide cases involving police officers. See State v. Thomas, 211 A.3d 
274, 296-97 (Md. 2019) (finding sufficient evidence to convict defendant of involuntary 
manslaughter where defendant was shown to have previously “distributed heroin to a 
substantial network of associates”); Mills v. State, 282 A.2d 147, 148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1971) (affirming minor defendant’s conviction of involuntary manslaughter, noting that 
defendant “created a dangerous situation” by bringing a loaded gun to a party).  
176 732 A.2d 920 (Md. Spec. App. 1999), aff’d 762 A.2d 97 (Md. 2000) 
177 Id. at 965. 
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hand, and (3) placement of his trigger finger along the “slide” of his Glock, rather 
than underneath the trigger guard.178  
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, rejected the State’s 
attempt to use this antecedent conduct of the officer to cast doubt on the 
reasonableness of the officer’s use of deadly force, noting that “’[r]egardless of what 
had transpired up until the shooting itself[,]’ in the present case, the calculated 
decision of [the deceased] to attempt to flee from lawful detention and to drive his 
car into Sergeant Pagotto’s body created a new and overriding reality.”179 Focusing 
narrowly on the moment that the officer chose to use deadly force as the only 
relevant time frame, the court explained, “the claim that an officer has unreasonably 
used excessive force must be assessed as of the moment when the force is 
employed.”180 To hammer home its opinion  that any pre-shooting conduct of the 
officer, even conduct that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation, was 
irrelevant, the court added, “[a]ntecedent and allegedly negligent acts that may have 
contributed to the creation of a dangerous situation are not pertinent in evaluating 
the officer’s state of mind at the critical moment when the gun, for instance, is 
discharged.181 The court concluded that the evidence presented in this case was not 
legally sufficient to support a finding of gross criminal negligence and therefor the 
charges of involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment should not have 
been submitted to the jury.182  
Ohio is the only other state that appears to have addressed the issue of 
whether the jury in a criminal prosecution involving an officer-defendant charged 
with a crime of violence may consider antecedent conduct of the officer and, like 
Maryland, has answered the question in the negative. In State v. White,183 a former 
police officer was convicted of felonious assault with a firearm for shooting a 
motorcyclist after a brief vehicle pursuit and was sentenced to ten years in prison.184 
In reversing the officer’s conviction, the Ohio Court of Appeals explained that 
analyzing an officer’s use of deadly force requires determining whether the officer 
reasonably perceived a threat and to make this determination, “the focus is 
specifically on the moment he used his weapon and in the moments 
directly preceding it.”185 The court also noted, “Earlier errors in the officer’s 
judgment do not make a shooting unreasonable if he was acting reasonably then.”186 
                                                            
178 Id. at 930-31. 
179 Id. at 965. 
180 Id. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 969. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. Maryland’s highest court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the officer’s convictions. 
State v. Pagotto, 762 A.2d 97, 107 (Md. 2000) (“we conclude that the Court of Special 
Appeals was correct in its determination that there was insufficient evidence to support 
[Sergeant] Pagotto’s convictions”).  
183 988 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. 2013), aff’d 29 N.E.3d 939 (Ohio 2015). 
184 Id. at 600. 
185 Id. at 614. 
186 Id. 




2. State Civil Cases on Whether Antecedent Conduct of a Police 
Officer Defendant May Be Considered by the Trier of Fact 
 
As is the case in the criminal context, most states have not addressed 
whether the trier of fact in a civil excessive force case is limited to considering only 
the events and circumstances that existed at the moment when the officer used force 
or whether it may consider antecedent conduct of the officer. The states that have 
addressed this issue are split.  
Four states—Alaska,187 Arizona,188 Colorado,189 and Maryland190—limit 
the jury’s consideration to the events and circumstances facing the officer at the 
moment when that officer used force. For example, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, the highest court in the state of Maryland, was asked in Richardson v. 
McGriff191 to decide whether the jury in a civil case brought against a police officer 
could consider the officer’s antecedent conduct or whether the jury was limited to 
considering only the circumstances contemporaneous with the officer’s use of 
                                                            
187 Lum v. Koles, 314 P.3d 546, 554 (Alaska 2013) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s 
provocation theory and the argument that an officer can be held liable for an otherwise 
defensible use of deadly force if (1) he intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent 
confrontation and (2) the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation); 
Maness v. Daily, 307 P.3d 894, 902–03 (Alaska 2013) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s 
provocation theory and the argument that an officer can be held liable for an otherwise 
defensible use of deadly force if (1) he intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent 
confrontation and (2) the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation). 
188 Robertson v. Territory, 108 P. 217, 220 (Ariz. Terr. 1910) (affirming officer’s 
manslaughter conviction while noting that “the rights of the [officer] with respect to his 
freedom of liability for the homicide, depend upon the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction at the time of the homicide rather than at the time of the commission of the 
[victim’s] misdemeanor in the street”), aff'd sub nom. Robertson v. Territory of Ariz., 188 
F. 783 (9th Cir. 1911).  
189 In a civil action brought by a police officer challenging his suspension for fatally 
shooting a developmentally disabled teenager and claiming that he acted in self-defense, a 
Colorado appellate court affirmed the officer’s suspension, applying the police 
department’s use of force policy and noting that it was typically interpreted “to cover only 
the circumstances existing at the moment force was used” and “the ‘immediate situation’ 
surrounding the force.” Turney v. Civ. Serv. Com’n, 222 P.3d 343, 349 (Colo. App. 2009). 
The court also noted, without citing any authority, that “Denver District Attorneys, 
investigating this and other police shootings, similarly have construed Colorado criminal 
self-defense laws to limit consideration to the “final frame” instant when shots were fired.” 
Id. 
190 In Randall v. Peaco, the Court of Special Appeals in Maryland was asked to consider 
whether the appellant should have been entitled “to have a fact finder assess the 
reasonableness of [the officer’s] decision to use lethal force by resort to antecedent events.” 
Randall v. Peaco, 927 A.2d 83, 88-89 (Md. Spec. App. 2007). The court responded, “The 
law in Maryland . . . is that events that are antecedent to the conduct of the officer at issue 
do not bear on the objective reasonableness of that conduct.” Id. at 89. The court then 
affirmed the lower court’s grant of the officer’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 93. 
191 762 A.2d 48 (Md. 2000). 
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force.192 Answering this question, the court held that the jury was limited to 
considering only the circumstances contemporaneous with the officer’s use of force 
and was not entitled to consider the antecedent conduct of the officer.193 
                                                            
192 The court framed the issue as follows: “The principal issue . . . is whether, in 
determining the necessity and objective reasonableness of Officer McGriff’s conduct when 
the closet door was opened by Officer Cameron, the jury should have been permitted to 
consider whether the officers violated any police guidelines or regulations in entering the 
apartment without additional back-up and in failing to turn on the kitchen lights. The 
question is thus one of permissible focus: is the jury limited to considering only the 
circumstances contemporaneous with the ‘seizure’—what immediately faced McGriff 
when the closet was opened—or was it entitled to consider as well, the reasonableness of 
the officer’s antecedent conduct?” Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000). 
193 Id. at 63 (“we hold that the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence subject to the 
in limine ruling . . . “). In a later case, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland described 
the holding in Richardson v. McGriff as follows: “The Court [in McGriff] concluded that 
the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force should be determined by examining 
the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of deadly force.” 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 891 A.2d 1134, 1141 (Md. Spec. App. 
2006), aff’d, 910 A.2d 463 (Md. 2006). 
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In contrast, six states—California,194 Illinois,195 Kansas,196 Louisiana,197 
Montana,198 and Washington199—and the District of Columbia200 allow the trier of 
                                                            
194 See Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252 (Cal. 2013) (“[l]aw enforcement 
personnel’s tactical conduct and decisions preceding the use of deadly force are relevant 
considerations under California law in determining whether the use of deadly force gives 
rise to negligence liability). Notably, the California Supreme Court cited Grudt v. City of 
Los Angeles, 468 P.2d 825, 830-31 (Cal. 1970), a previous case in which the court held that 
the jury in a wrongful death action against the city and police officers arising from a fatal 
shooting of the plaintiff’s husband may consider the preshooting conduct of officers in 
assessing whether a law enforcement officer who shot and killed a driver who accelerated 
toward him was negligent. 305 P.3d at 256. Commenting on the facts of Grudt, the Hayes 
court noted that although “the shooting in Grudt appeared justified if examined in isolation, 
because the driver was accelerating his car toward one of the officers just before the 
shooting,” considering “the totality of the circumstances, including the preshooting conduct 
of the officers, might persuade a jury to find the shooting negligent.” Id. 
195 In Price v. City of Chicago, a wrongful death civil action against a police officer, the 
Illinois Appellate Court noted that it was up to the jury to consider the evidence—which 
included evidence of both the officers’ and the victim’s pre-shooting conduct—and decide 
“who to believe and whether the intimate contact” between the officers and the decedent 
put the defendant “in such a position that deadly force was unjustified.” 97 N.E.3d 188, 
197 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2018).  
196 In Est. of Randolph v. City of Wichita, 459 P.3d 802 (Kan. App. 2020), the decedent’s 
estate and family members asserted a variety of tort claims against a police officer, 
including battery for using his taser and pistol against the decedent, who had a mental 
illness. The officer asserted that he acted in self-defense and acted in accordance with stand 
your ground rules in shooting the decedent, who had emerged from the house and was 
walking toward the officer. Id. at 818. In reversing the trial court’s entry of summary 
judgment for the officer on the battery claim, the Court of Appeals noted that the facts “do 
not establish that [the officers] merely stood his ground” but “moved toward [the 
decedent], as if to engage him,” which was a relevant consideration for the fact-finder. Id. 
197 In Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969 (La. 1977), a civil suit brought against 
several police officers and the city of New Orleans, the Louisiana Supreme Court appeared 
to consider the officers’ pre-shooting conduct in finding that the officers had used 
excessive force. In listing what factors should be considered in a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, the court included “the existence of alternative methods of arrest.” 
Id. at 973. But see Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318 (La. 1994) (noting in a 
civil case filed against the City of New Orleans and police officers for shooting an armed 
suspect that “the existence of other available alternative methods does not, in and of itself, 
render the method chosen unreasonable”). Id. at 324 (emphasis in the original).  
198 In Scott v. Henrich, 958 P.2d 709 (Mont. 1998), the plaintiff presented expert testimony 
opining that “the officers’ role in the events leading up to the shooting death of [the 
decedent] was unreasonable” because the officers employed an “‘assault’ on the doorway.” 
Id. at 712. The court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the officers, 
explaining that in light of the plaintiff’s evidence, “reasonable jurors could differ as to 
whether the officers acted reasonably on the day of the shooting.” Id. at 713. 
199 In Beltran-Serrano v. City of Tacoma, a homeless man brought a civil suit against the 
City of Tacoma for negligence and assault and battery, arising from an encounter with a 
police officer that resulted in the plaintiff being shot multiple times. 442 P.3d 608 (Wash. 
2019). After the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed a motion 
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fact in a civil case involving allegations that a police officer used excessive force to 
consider antecedent conduct of the officer in assessing the reasonableness of the 
officer’s use of force. One of these decisions deserves mention for its colorful “tiger 
in a cage” analogy. In District of Columbia v. Evans,201 a civil wrongful death action 
brought by a shooting victim’s mother against police officers, plaintiff’s counsel 
argued that the officers’ pre-shooting conduct was “analogous to someone entering 
a cage with a tiger in it.”202 Counsel added, “once you are in that cage, you might 
have to kill the tiger. . .”203 The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed and held that the 
plaintiff’s “tiger in a cage” theory should have been presented to a jury.204 
 
III.  BROADENING THE TIME FRAME 
 
In this last Part, I set forth several arguments in favor of broadening the time 
frame and allowing the trier of fact in a state criminal prosecution of a law 
enforcement officer to consider officer-created jeopardy, i.e., unwise conduct of the 
officer that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. Before laying out these 
                                                            
for direct discretionary review with the Washington Supreme Court. Id. at 611. The 
Washington Supreme Court reversed, noting that under the standard governing the use of 
deadly force by a police officer, “the facts of this case must be evaluated under the totality 
of the circumstances, including [the officer’s] preshooting conduct.” Id. at 613 (emphasis 
added). In a previous case, an intermediate court of appeals in a civil case in which 
survivors and estate of individual fatally shot by police officers brought a § 1983 action 
and state tort claims against the City of Spokane and its officers, ruled the opposite way, 
stating “We must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force from the perspective 
of a reasonable officer on the scene, applying a ‘standard of the moment.’” Estate of Lee ex 
rel. v. City of Spokane, 2 P.3d 979, 986 (Wash. 2000). To hammer home this point, the 
court added, “We look only at the actual seizure, not the events leading up to the seizure.” 
Id. 
200 For example, in Barrett v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia considered whether it was prejudicial error in a criminal prosecution of a police 
officer for assault for the trial court to have restricted the jury to considering only the 
circumstances surrounding the arrest and not antecedent knowledge of the officer about the 
victim being suspected of murder. 64 F.2d 148 (D.C. Ct. App. 1933). In that case, the 
defendant officer had requested but was denied a jury instruction that would have 
instructed the jury that they were allowed to “take into consideration every circumstance 
leading up to and surrounding the arrest and also any knowledge which the officer may 
possess concerning the danger of effecting the arrest.” Id. at 150. The appellate court held 
that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to have “restricted the inquiry of the jury to 
the occasion of the arrest and [to] ignore[] precedent circumstances.” Id. 
201 644 A.2d 1008 (D.C. 1994). 
202 Id.at 1021. The plaintiff argued that “the officers’ [preshooting] conduct in pursuing [the 
victim] outside his home . . . agitated [the victim] . . . rather than calming him down,”  and 
created the officers’ need to use deadly force. Id. The court agreed, noting that the 
“evidence that [the officer] entered the scene suddenly, with her gun drawn, . . . coupled 
with the expert’s testimony that [the officer] had not followed required police procedures in 
the way she approached the scene,” supported the plaintiff’s theory. Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
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arguments, I provide a theoretical framework for understanding the issue at hand. 
After laying out the arguments supporting a broad time frame, I address possible 
objections to a broad time frame. 
  
A. Broad vs. Narrow Time Framing in Mark Kelman’s 
Interpretive Construction in the Criminal Law 
 
In Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law,205 Mark 
Kelman unmasks an interpretive time-framing construct operating in the context of 
the voluntary act requirement in the criminal law. As first-year law students learn 
when they study criminal law, a basic element common to all crimes is the actus reus 
requirement.206 The actus reus element can be proven by showing that the defendant 
engaged in a voluntary act, or an omission where there was a legal duty to act, that 
caused social harm.207 A voluntary act is commonly understood as a volitional 
movement of the body willed by the actor.208 
The need for a voluntary act as a prerequisite for criminal liability is 
reflected in Martin v. State,209 a case that appears in many criminal law casebooks. 
In Martin, an Alabama court overturned the conviction of an intoxicated man who 
was removed from his home by police and taken onto the highway, then arrested for 
being drunk on a public highway.210 The court found in favor of Mr. Martin because 
he did not voluntarily appear in public while intoxicated.211 In other words, he did 
not engage in a voluntary act as is generally required before one can be convicted. 
Another important case that appears in the actus reus section of many 
criminal law casebooks is State v. Decina.212 In this case, a man with a history of 
epileptic seizures lost consciousness while driving due to an epileptic seizure, then 
struck and killed four schoolchildren.213 Mr. Decina was found guilty of four counts 
of criminal negligence in the operation of the vehicle resulting in death.214 
Even though much of the majority’s discussion centers on questions of 
culpability and whether Mr. Decina had the requisite mens rea to be found guilty, 
State v. Decina is included most criminal law casebooks because it allows law 
                                                            
205 Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591 (1981). 
206 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §9.01 (Carolina Academic Press 
8th ed. 2018).  
207 Id. 
208 Id. at §9.02[C][2]. 
209 Martin v. State, 17 So.2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944).  
210 Id. at 427. 
211 Id. (“Under the plain terms of the statute, a voluntary appearance is presupposed . . . an 
accusation of drunkenness in a designated public place cannot be established by proof that 
the accused, while in an intoxicated condition, was involuntarily and forcibly carried to that 
place by the arresting officer."). 
212 State v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956).  
213 Id. at 801-03. 
214 Id. at 803. On appeal, his convictions were reversed because communications he had 
with his doctor were improperly admitted into evidence. Id. 
45 Officer-Created Jeopardy [2-1-2021] 
 
 
students to learn about the defense of unconsciousness. The unconsciousness 
defense allows a defendant who was unconscious at the time of the act that caused 
the social harm to be acquitted on the ground that a key element of the crime, the 
actus reus requirement, cannot be satisfied.215 More specifically, if the defendant 
was unconscious at the time of his act, the prosecution cannot prove that a voluntary 
act by the defendant caused the social harm.216 Voluntary acts are willed, volitional 
movements of the body and a person who is unconscious is not willing their body to 
move.217  
The Decina case gives law students the opportunity to think about whether 
an individual who has an epileptic seizure at the wheel is acting voluntarily when he 
crashes his vehicle and causes death or other social harm.   Judge Desmond, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in Decina, argued that Mr. Decina was not 
acting voluntarily when he drove his car into the schoolchildren and therefore could 
not be held criminally liable for their deaths, explaining:  
One cannot while unconscious “operate” a car in a culpably 
negligent manner or in any other “manner.” The statute makes 
criminal a particular kind of knowing, voluntary, immediate 
operation. It does not touch at all the involuntary presence of an 
unconscious person at the wheel of an uncontrolled vehicle.218  
Kelman compares the results in Martin and Decina, noting that the Martin 
court focused narrowly on the moment when the police took Mr. Martin from his 
house out onto the public highway to reach its conclusion that Mr. Martin did not 
voluntarily put himself on the public highway while intoxicated.219 In contrast, even 
though Mr. Decina was not acting voluntarily at the time he drove his car into the 
schoolchildren—at that time, he was unconscious due to an epileptic seizure—the 
court found Mr. Decina acted with the requisite voluntariness. Kelman explains that 
the only way the Decina court could find a voluntary act was by broadening the time 
                                                            
215 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 612 §9.4 (6th ed. 2017). 
216 Id. at 616 §9.4(1). 
217 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 206, at 88 §9.02[C][2] (“With 
a voluntary act, a human being—a person—and not simply an organ of a human being, 
causes the bodily action. Thus, when D’s arm strikes V as the result of an epileptic seizure, 
we sense that D’s body, but not D the person, has caused the impact.”) (emphasis in the 
original). 
218 138 N.E.2d at 808 (Desmond, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis 
added). Th majority rejected Judge Desmond’s argument but instead of countering the 
dissent’s actus reus argument, the majority focused on Mr. Decina’s culpable state of mind. 
Emphasizing Mr. Decina’s knowledge and recklessness, the majority explained, “this 
defendant knew he was subject to epileptic attacks and seizures that might strike at any 
time. He also knew that a moving motor vehicle uncontrolled on a public highway is a 
highly dangerous instrumentality capable of unrestrained destruction. With this knowledge, 
and without anyone accompanying him, he deliberately took a chance by making a 
conscious choice of a course of action, in disregard of the consequences which he knew 
might follow from his conscious act, and which in this case did ensue.” Id. at 803-804. 
219 Kelman, supra note 205, at 603. 
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frame. In other words, the court had to reach back in time to find a voluntary act—
Mr. Decina’s voluntary decision to get behind the wheel and start driving.220  
Kelman notes that the Martin court, like the Decina court, could have 
reached back in time to find a voluntary act had it wanted to find Mr. Martin 
criminally liable. He explains:   
. . . it is quite possible that the defendant was arrested for activity he 
was engaging in at home: for instance, beating his wife. Why did 
the court not consider saying that the voluntary act at time one (wife 
beating) both posed a risk of and caused a harmful involuntary act 
at time two (public drunkenness) and assess[] the voluntariness of 
the alleged criminal act with reference to the wider time-framed 
scenario?221   
Continuing to compare the Decina case to the Martin case, Kelman notes, “It cannot 
be that the involuntary, harmful act at time two was unforeseeable. The probability 
of an epileptic blackout is almost certainly far lower than the probability of ending 
up in public after engaging in behavior likely to draw police attention.”222  
Now, we have no evidence that Mr. Martin was beating his wife. We do not 
even know if Mr. Martin had a wife, but it is still true that the Martin court could 
have easily broadened the time frame and found a voluntary act. It could have noted 
that Martin voluntarily put the bottle to his lips and drank the liquor that made him 
intoxicated, which caused him to be loud and boisterous, and likely led his neighbor 
to call the police. 
Kelman concludes that depending on how broadly or narrowly the court 
construes the relevant time frame, a court can find a voluntary act and hold the 
defendant criminally liable or the court can say that the defendant did not act 
voluntarily and relieve the defendant of criminal liability. Shifting between broad 
and narrow time frames by different courts results in arbitrary results. 
Just as an interpretive time-framing construct operates in the background of 
ordinary criminal law cases, influencing how the voluntary act requirement in the 
criminal law gets applied, which in turn affects whether a criminal defendant can 
even be convicted of a crime, an interpretive time-framing construct operates in the 
background in officer-involved shooting cases. And just as courts hold the key as to 
how broadly or narrowly to construe the time frame for determining whether a 
defendant engaged in a voluntary act that caused the social harm, courts that oversee 
criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers, civil cases involving law 
enforcement officer-defendants charged with torts under civil tort law, and § 1983 
cases hold the key as to how broadly or narrowly to construe the relevant time frame 
for determining the reasonableness of a law enforcement officer’s use of deadly 
force.  
 
B. Reasons to Broaden the Time Frame  
 
                                                            
220 Id.  
221 Id. at 604. 
222 Id. 
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There are at least three reasons why the trier of fact should be allowed to 
broaden the time frame and consider any conduct of the officer that increased the 
risk of a deadly confrontation. First, in ordinary homicide cases in which a civilian 
is charged with having killed another person and claims self-defense, the jury may 
consider conduct of the defendant that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. 
Officer-defendants claiming self-defense should not be treated more leniently than 
civilian-defendants claiming self-defense. If anything, law enforcement officers 
should be held to a higher standard than civilians since they are entrusted with the 
authority to use deadly force and are trained in the use of such force.223 
 Second, in officer-involved shooting cases, the jury is allowed to consider 
conduct by the victim that led the officer to believe it was necessary to use deadly 
force to protect the officer or another. If the jury is allowed to consider the victim’s 
pre-shooting conduct that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation, it should be 
allowed to consider conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation. 
 Third, in officer-involved shooting cases, the jury is permitted to consider 
conduct of the officer that decreased the risk of a deadly confrontation that supports 
the officer’s argument that his use of deadly force was appropriate. For example, if 
the officer took cover, called for backup, tried to calm the suspect, or used less 
deadly force prior to using deadly force, the jury is not only allowed but encouraged 
by the officer-defendant’s attorney to consider this de-escalation conduct in 
assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force. If the jury can consider 
conduct of the officer that decreased the risk of a deadly confrontation, it should be 
allowed to consider conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation as well. 
 
1. Juries in Civilian Homicide Cases Are Allowed to Consider 
Antecedent Conduct of the Defendant in Assessing the 
Defendant’s Claim of Self-Defense  
 
The first reason to broaden the time frame and allow the jury in a criminal 
prosecution of a law enforcement officer charged with a crime of violence who 
claims his use of force was justified to consider officer conduct that increased the 
risk of a deadly confrontation is because the jury is allowed to consider such conduct 
                                                            
223 Rachel Tecott & Sara Plana, Maybe U.S. Police Aren’t Militarized Enough. Here’s 
What Police Can Learn from Soldiers, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/16/maybe-u-s-police-
arent-militarized-enough-soldiers-are-better-trained-to-deescalate/ 
(https://perma.cc/N6AW-6KGA) (arguing that since “police officers have a job that 
necessarily puts them in tense and often violent situations that they should be trained to de-
escalate[,] . . . [t]he legal standard should be higher for police than for civilians.”); Nancy 
A. Ruffin, Why Police Officers Need to Be Held to Higher Standards, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-police-officers-need-_b_12158042 
(https://perma.cc/JGP8-VJYX) (arguing that because law enforcement officers choose a job 
that necessarily involves the risk of death and are trained in ways that the average 
American is not, they should be held to a higher standard). 
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in an ordinary criminal case in which a civilian is charged with a crime of violence 
and claims his use of force was justified. When an ordinary civilian is charged with 
murder, manslaughter, assault, or battery and claims he acted in self-defense, the 
jury assessing the defendant’s claim of self-defense may consider conduct by the 
defendant that increased the risk of death even if that conduct occurred prior to the 
moment in time when the defendant used deadly force against the victim. 
Take, for example, the Trayvon Martin or, more accurately, the George 
Zimmerman case. Zimmerman was the Neighborhood Watch Captain who became 
a household name once it became known that he shot and killed an unarmed Black 
teenager named Trayvon Martin.224 Martin was walking back to his father’s place 
after going to the store to get some candy and a non-alcoholic beverage when he was 
confronted by Zimmerman.225 Zimmerman had called 911 to report Martin as a 
suspicious person and was told by the 911 dispatcher to stay in his vehicle and wait 
for police to arrive.226 Zimmerman, however, disregarded the 911 dispatcher’s 
suggestion and confronted Martin.227 He claimed he shot Martin in self-defense after 
the two got into a physical fight and Zimmerman found himself on the ground with 
Martin on top, punching him.228  
The jury was presented with evidence of Zimmerman’s antecedent conduct 
that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation—namely, that Zimmerman got out 
of his vehicle and confronted Martin, disregarding the dispatcher’s suggestion that 
he not follow Martin.229 Zimmerman’s act of confronting Martin set in motion the 
events that culminated in a violent confrontation with the two males fighting with 
                                                            
224 Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-
Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1555 (2013) (hereinafter Lee, Making Race Salient); Dan 
Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm. In Florida, an Intersection of Tragedy, Race and 
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1.  
225 Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 224 at 1557-58. 
226 Id. at 1557; Melanie Jones, Trayvon Martin Case: 911 Tapes ‘Not as Conclusive as 
People Think,’ Says Defense Attorney, Int’l Bus. Times (Mar. 23, 2012) (2:56 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/trayvon-martin-case-911-tapes-not-conclusive-people-think-says-
defense-attorney-429306.  
227 Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 224 at 1557-58. 
228 Id. at 1158. 
229 Sean Noffke, the 911 dispatcher who responded to Zimmerman’s call, testified at 
Zimmerman’s trial and told the jury that he suggested that Zimmerman not follow Martin. 
First Witnesses Take Stand In Zimmerman Trial, CBS MIAMI (June 24, 2013, 2:40PM), 
https://miami.cbslocal.com/2013/06/24/opening-statements-monday-in-zimmerman-trial/ 
(https://perma.cc/NZ4P-5UKN); Stephen Loiaconi and HLNtv.com, Get Caught Up: Week 
1 of Zimmerman Trial, CNN (updated June 29, 2013, 5:47PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/29/justice/zimmerman-trial-recap/index.html 
(https://perma.cc/JMS5-AF2P). Zimmerman did not take the stand, but the jury heard 
through recorded police interviews with Zimmerman that he pursued Martin, initially in his 
car and later on foot. The Zimmerman Trial, Day by Day, N.Y. TIMES, Day 6 (July 12, 
2013), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/07/12/us/zimmerman-
highlights.html (https://perma.cc/QNA7-L8VK).  
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each other and Martin getting shot and killed.230 The jury acquitted Zimmerman of 
all charges.231 
Law enforcement officers claiming justifiable force are basically arguing 
that they acted in self-defense. Subject to a few exceptions, such as duty to retreat 
rules and initial aggressor rules that commonly apply to civilians but not to law 
enforcement officers,232 law enforcement officers should be held to at least the same 
standard as the ordinary civilian. Indeed, I would argue that law enforcement officers 
should be held to a higher standard than ordinary civilians since law enforcement 
officers are given the authority to use deadly force in the line of duty and are trained 
in the use of deadly force.233  
 
2. In Officer-Involved Shooting Cases, the Jury Is Allowed to 
Consider Antecedent Conduct of the Victim 
 
 A second reason to broaden the time frame and allow juries in officer-
involved shooting cases to consider antecedent conduct of the officer that increased 
the risk of a violent confrontation is that juries in these types of cases are typically 
allowed to consider antecedent conduct of the victim that increased the risk of a 
violent confrontation.234 If the jury can consider antecedent conduct of the victim 
                                                            
230 For additional commentary on this case, see Cynthia Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 12 
OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 91 (2014) (critiquing the enforcement of colorblindness at the 
Zimmerman murder trial); Cynthia Lee, Denying the Significance of Race: Colorblindness 
and the Zimmerman Trial, in Trayvon Martin, Race, and American Justice: Writing Wrong 
(Sense Publishers 2014) (explaining how all of the legal actors involved in the Trayvon 
Martin case denied the significance of race to Trayvon Martin’s detriment). 
231 Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-
verdict-trayvon-martin.html (https://perma.cc/E5YA-CHYY).  
232 See supra note 16. 
233 SpearIt, Firepower to the People! Gun Rights & the Law of Self-Defense to Curb Police 
Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 189, 247 (2017) (arguing that police should be held to a 
higher standard than civilians since “[t]hey are the ones with training and temperament 
that should make violence a last resort”); Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly 
Force, supra note 11, at 687 (noting that “unlike ordinary civilians, police officers are 
entrusted with the power to use force” and arguing that “[w]hen an officer allegedly 
abuses that power, that officer should be held to a higher standard than ordinary 
civilians”). See also Cynthia Lee, But I Thought He Had a Gun: Race and Police Use of 
Deadly Force, 2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 48 (2004) (noting that law enforcement 
officers are currently held to a higher standard than civilians since we compare the law 
enforcement officer on trial to the reasonable law enforcement officer and that it makes 
sense to increase the scrutiny when one takes a human life). 
234 For example, in Robinson v. State, involving a state criminal prosecution of two white 
police officers who shot and killed a Black man in a parking lot, the jury was allowed to 
consider the fact that prior to being shot, the victim had threatened another person with a 
knife. 473 S.E.2d 519, 520 (Ga. Ct. App.1996). See also State v. Smith, 807 A.2d 500, 509-
10 (Conn. App. 2002) (suggesting it was proper for the jury to consider the conduct of the 
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that supports an officer’s claim that he reasonably believed it was necessary to use 
deadly force against the victim to protect the officer or another against the threat of 
death or serious bodily injury, it is only fair to allow the jury to consider antecedent 
conduct of the officer that undermines the officer’s argument that his use of deadly 
force was reasonable. 
 For example, the jury in the case involving the officer-involved shooting 
death of Laquan McDonald in Chicago, Illinois was allowed to hear about 
McDonald’s pre-shooting conduct that made Officer Jason Van Dyke, the officer 
who shot McDonald, perceive his life to be in danger. Even though McDonald, who 
was holding a large knife at his side, was not advancing toward Officer Van Dyke 
nor being aggressive towards anyone else at the moment he was shot, Officer Van 
Dyke’s attorneys presented evidence that prior to being shot, McDonald had used 
the knife he was holding to slash the tire on a patrol car and damage its windshield 
to support Officer Van Dyke’s claim that he believed McDonald posed a threat.235 
Attorneys for Officer Van Dyke were even allowed to present evidence of 
McDonald’s history of violent outbursts and drug use even though Officer Van Dyke 
had never met McDonald prior to the night he shot McDonald and did not know 
about the teen’s past history.236 
 Similarly, in the Walter Scott case, in which law enforcement officer 
Michael Slager was charged with murder after he was caught on video chasing an 
unarmed Black man, Walter Scott, and shooting him in the back five times after 
stopping Scott for a broken tail light,237 attorneys for Officer Slager were permitted 
                                                            
victim in deciding whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe that deadly force was 
necessary to defend himself or others). 
235 Megan Crepeau & Stacy St. Clair, 5 Takeaways from the First Day of the Jason Van 
Dyke Trial, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-
mcdonald/ct-met-laquan-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-trial-20180917-story.html 
(https://perma.cc/LY6F-TCUS) (Officer Slager’s defense team argued that McDonald 
raised the threat level when he slashed the tire on a patrol car and scraped its windshield). 
See also Kori Rumore & Chad Yoder, Minute by Minute: How Jason Van Dyke Shot 
Laquan McDonald, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-mcdonald/ct-jason-vandyke-laquan-
mcdonald-timeline-htmlstory.html (https://perma.cc/8UQ4-QMDX) (noting that Laquan 
McDonald slashed the tire on a patrol car between 9:53 and 9:56 PM and was first shot at 
9:57 PM). 
236 Michael Lansu & Mark Lebien, Chicago Police Officer Found Guilty of 2nd-Degree 
Murder of Laquan McDonald, NPR (Oct. 5, 2018) (3:01 PM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/05/654465522/chicago-police-officer-found-guilty-of-
second-degree-murder-of-laquan-mcdonald (https://perma.cc/E4AC-RVPA) (noting that 
Officer Van Dyke’s lawyers called current and former Cook County Juvenile Detention 
Center employees who testified that McDonald “got into fights, needed to be restrained, 
and admitted to taking PCP” even though prosecutors unsuccessfully argued that 
McDonald’s past was irrelevant because Van Dyke had never met McDonald prior to the 
night he shot and killed the African American teenager). 
237 Matthew Vann & Erik Ortiz, Walter Scott Shooting: Michael Slager, Ex-Officer, 
Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison, NBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2017), 
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to present evidence to the jury regarding Walter Scott’s failure to pay child support 
and drug use even though Officer Slager had no knowledge of any of this history at 
the time he shot Scott.238 Despite the video clearly showing Officer Slager shooting 
Scott in the back as Scott was running away and then appearing to plant his taser 
next to Scott after Scott was lying lifeless on the ground,239 the jury hung, leading 
the judge to declare a mistrial.240 The ability of Officer Slager’s attorneys to paint 
Walter Scott as a deadbeat dad and a drug user241 while emphasizing the dangerous 
work that police officers do, particularly in low income high crime neighborhoods 
like the one in which the shooting occurred, helped convince at least three jurors and 
one alternate juror in the state criminal case that Officer Slager was not guilty of any 
crime at all.242  
                                                            
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/walter-scott-shooting/walter-scott-shooting-michael-
slager-ex-officer-sentenced-20-years-n825006 (https://perma.cc/F8NG-3PWS) 
 (noting that according to the coroner, “[Officer] Slager fired eight shots at Scott as he ran 
away, striking him five times, including three in the back”).  
238 See Alan Blinder, Walter Scott’s Character Scrutinized in Trial of Officer Who Killed 
Him, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/us/walter-scott-
michael-slager-trial.html (https://perma.cc/UST4-4MMZ) (noting comments about Walter 
Scott’s history of child support debts and drug use during opening statements in the murder 
trial of the officer who killed him); Brenda Rindge et al., Watch: Judge Declares a Mistrial 
in Murder Trial for Former Officer Michael Slager, POST & COURIER (Dec. 2, 2016), 
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/watch-judge-declares-a-mistrial-in-murder-trial-for-
former-officer-michael-slager/article_48ba1684-a10b-11e6-a639-a3b9a114da5f.html 
(https://perma.cc/FRL8-XSAP) (noting testimony from defense witnesses about Scott’s 
history of child support debts and drug use).  
239 Keith O’Shea & Darran Simon, Closing Arguments End in Slager Trial, No Verdict 
Reached, CNN (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/30/us/michael-slager-murder-
trial-walter-scott (https://perma.cc/WXV4-MEW5).  
240 Darran Simon et al., Judge Declares Mistrial in Michael Slager Trial, CNN (Dec. 6, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/05/us/michael-slager-murder-trial-walter-scott-
mistrial (https://perma.cc/6KRP-AYQ9). 
241 See supra note 239. 
242 Guest Lecture by Attorney Jared Fishman in my Criminal Procedure class at the George 
Washington University Law School on February 20, 2020 and email correspondence with 
Mr. Fishman dated November 23, 2020. Fishman was the federal prosecutor who worked 
on the Walter Scott case on the federal side, which led to a plea bargain in which Officer 
Slager pled guilty to a federal civil rights charge of using excessive force. Holly Yan et al., 
Ex-Officer Michael Slager Pleads Guilty in Shooting Death of Walter Scott, CNN (May 2, 
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/02/us/michael-slager-federal-plea/index.html  
(https://perma.cc/W448-W9R2). As a result of his guilty plea, Slager was sentenced to 
twenty years in prison. Mark Berman, Former S.C. Police Officer Who Shot Unarmed Man 
is Sentenced to 20 Years, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2017, at A2. Several jurors from the South 
Carolina prosecution felt so strongly that Officer Slager was innocent that they wrote 
letters to the judge overseeing the federal civil rights case against Slager prior to Slager’s 
sentencing, urging leniency for Slager. Andrew Knapp, Michael Slager’s Sentencing to 
Mark End of Still-Contested Courtroom Battle in Walter Scott Killing, POST & COURIER 
(Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/michael-slagers-sentencing-to-
mark-end-of-still-contested-courtroom-battle-in-walter-scott-killing/article_843d4232-
d385-11e7-9df4-0fdb6c8c45bb.html (https://perma.cc/62DW-HPWS).  
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 Rachel Harmon suggests a related reason to allow the jury to consider the 
officer’s pre-seizure conduct.243 In her important article arguing that police use of 
force law should include necessity, imminence, and proportionality requirements 
just as ordinary self-defense law does, Harmon notes that the Supreme Court in 
Graham v. Connor called for consideration of the nature of the suspect’s crime even 
though it is the officer who is the one on trial in a § 1983 case.244 Cara McClellan 
raises a similar critique,245 noting that the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor 
“explicitly identifie[d] the severity of the crime as one of the factors that courts must 
consider.”246 McClellan ties her critique more closely to the problem of narrow time 
framing in the use of force context, noting that considering the severity of the crime 
committed by the individual means courts must “contextualize an interaction beyond 
the temporal period when the seizure happened.”247 McClellan compares the 
severity of the crime, which involves consideration of conduct that the victim-
suspect was suspected of committing prior to the officer’s use of force on that 
individual, to pre-seizure conduct of the officer, which is also a “non-
contemporaneous factor that can provide context for interpreting the reasonableness 
of the seizure itself.”248  
 Seth Stoughton highlights the double-standard that courts are applying in 
this situation: 
With regard to the officer, the courts look only at the use of force itself or, 
perhaps, a few seconds prior to the use of force. With regard to the subject, 
however, the courts are willing to adopt a much more expansive perspective. 
249  
Like Harmon and McClellan, Stoughton observes that “Graham . . . direct[s] courts 
to consider the severity of the crime even when the subject is suspected of having 
committed it minutes, hours, days, or weeks earlier.”250 In other words, courts 
broaden the time frame when it comes to the victim-suspect’s behavior while 
narrowing the time frame when dealing with the officer’s conduct. Stoughton notes 
that “[i]n application, . . . ‘final frame’ perspective becomes one-sided, determining 
the reasonableness of a use of force by looking to the subject’s precipitating 
behaviors but ignoring the officer’s [precipitating conduct].”251 
The severity of the crime that the victim is suspected of having committed 
or trying to commit is a factor that the Supreme Court has indicated is relevant to 
                                                            
243 Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW UNIV. L. REV. 1119 
(2008). 
244 Id. at 1164. 
245 Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap: Untangling the Chain of Events in Excessive 
Force Claims, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 19-23 (2017) (arguing that courts should apply 
proximate causation analysis to decide § 1983 excessive force claims). 
246 Id. at 17. 
247 Id. 
248 Id.  
249 Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 
supra note 5, at 558. 
250 Id.  
251 Id. at 559. 
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the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force. The crime that the victim was 
committing or trying to commit involves conduct of the victim prior to the moment 
of the officer’s use of force. If the trier of fact can consider antecedent conduct of 
the victim when assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s use of force, the trier 
of fact should be allowed to consider antecedent conduct of the officer as well. 
 
3. Jury Is Allowed to Consider De-escalation Conduct of the 
Officer that Decreased the Risk of a Deadly Confrontation  
 
A third reason to broaden the time frame is that the jury in an officer-
involved shooting case is allowed to consider de-escalation tactics used by a law 
enforcement officer—antecedent conduct that usually decreases the risk of a 
confrontation turning deadly—when assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s 
use of force. If the officer took cover, called for backup, or tried to talk with or calm 
the individual, the jury may consider this conduct in assessing the reasonableness of 
the officer’s use of force. If the jury can consider antecedent actions of the police 
that decrease the risk of a deadly confrontation, it should be able to consider 
antecedent actions of the police that increase the risk of a deadly confrontation. 
For example, in one case involving the shooting of an unarmed Black man 
in Tulsa, Oklahoma by a White female police officer in September 2016,252 Officer 
Betty Shelby, charged with first-degree manslaughter in the death of Terence 
Crutcher, was permitted to testify at trial about her efforts to de-escalate the situation 
before she shot Crutcher.253 Shelby told the jury that she talked with Crutcher for 3 
minutes and 24 seconds and asked him to get down on his knees before she shot 
him.254 Shelby said she fired out of fear when she killed Crutcher even though he 
had his hands above his head and was walking away from her when he was shot.255 
Shelby was acquitted.256 No weapon was found either on Crutcher or in his car 
immediately after the shooting.257 
                                                            
252 Video footage released by the Tulsa Police Department of the officer-involved shooting 
of Terence Crutcher can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJd4ThiQjEg&ab_channel=WallStreetJournal (Sept. 
20, 2016) (https://perma.cc/9U7U-5TZ4). 
253 KTUL, Betty Shelby Takes Stand In Own Defense, Alternate Juror Joins Panel, 
ABCNEWS CHANNEL 8 (May 15, 2017), https://ktul.com/news/local/testimony-continues-
as-shelby-manslaughter-trial-enters-2nd-week (https://perma.cc/BZ3Z-W4KR). 
254 Id. 
255 Faith Karimi, e al., Tulsa Officer Acquitted In Fatal Shooting Of Terence Crutcher, 
CNN.COM (May 18, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/17/us/tulsa-police-shooting-
trial/index.html (https://perma.cc/E3KL-KTRS). Shelby said she shot Crutcher because she 
thought he was reaching into his vehicle to get a weapon. Betty Shelby, Police Officer 
Cleared In Terence Crutcher Killing, Resigns, CBSNews (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/betty-shelby-police-officer-cleared-terence-crutcher-
killing-resigns/ (https://perma.cc/4JEN-MSC6). 
256 Karimi, supra note 255 (noting that after 9 hours of deliberation, the jury acquitted 
Officer Betty Shelby in the shooting death of Terence Crutcher). 
257 Man Fatally Shot By Tulsa Police Had No Gun, Chief Says, ABC13 EYEWITNESS NEWS 
(Sept. 19, 2016), https://abc13.com/unarmed-black-man-shot-by-police-terence-crutcher-
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In Hernandez v. City of Pomona,258 family members of a man shot and killed 
by police officers while fleeing an arrest brought a negligence action against the 
officers and the city.259 The issue on appeal had nothing to do with whether 
antecedent conduct of the officer that created or increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation may be considered by the jury but whether a federal judgment in favor 
of law enforcement officers has any preclusive effect on a civil rights claim brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have in a subsequent state court wrongful death action when 
the federal court enters judgment in favor of law enforcement officers and dismisses 
a supplemental state law wrongful death claim?260 The California Supreme Court 
held that the prior federal judgment collaterally estopped the plaintiffs from pursuing 
their wrongful death claim.261  
What is interesting about this case, however, is that the officers were all in 
favor of the jury considering their pre-shooting conduct, which included the fact that 
prior to the fatal shooting, one officer had refrained from shooting the suspect even 
after another officer had incorrectly shouted that the suspect had a gun and that the 
others should shoot him, and that the officers had tried to stop the decedent with a 
police dog prior to shooting him.262 While disagreeing with the officers’ claim that 
the federal court and jury made a finding as to the reasonableness of the officers’ 
pre-shooting conduct, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that since the 
jury was instructed to consider the totality of the circumstances, the jury “necessarily 
considered the evidence regarding the officers’ pre-shooting conduct.”263  
 
C. Which Pre-Seizure Conduct Should the Trier of Fact Be Allowed to 
Consider? 
 
In addition to the temporal question of how narrowly or broadly to frame 
the inquiry into the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, I want to flag another 
question, which Judge Jack Zouhary calls the qualitative issue of what types of 
antecedent conduct should be considered relevant to the excessive force analysis.264 
There are a few different ways one could limit the types of antecedent conduct 
considered by the jury.  
First, one could impose a causation requirement, requiring that the 
antecedent conduct be causally connected to the later decision to use force. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez,265 in 
                                                            
shooting-tulsa-pd/1518062/ (https://perma.cc/3F84-UMSL) (reporting that “Tulsa Police 
Chief Chuck Jordan announced Monday before the department released the shooting 
footage that 40-year-old Terence Crutcher had no weapon on him or in his SUV” and 
showing police released video footage of the shooting). 
258 207 P.3d 506 (Cal. 2009). 
259 Id. at 511. 
260 Id. at 510. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 511. 
263 Id. 
264 Zouhary, supra note 5, at 20. 
265 County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. ___; 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017). 
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which the Court deemed the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule unconstitutional but 
suggested that proximate causation was an alternative way to hold the officers liable 
for their use of force, some urged the federal courts to adopt a proximate causation 
approach.266 Second, one could impose a requirement that the officer’s earlier 
conduct must have been intentional or reckless, as the Tenth Circuit does.267  
While I agree that there should be some connection between the antecedent 
police conduct and the later use of force, I do not join the chorus of those urging 
courts to add a proximate causation requirement to the inquiry. The rules regarding 
proximate causation in the criminal law are complex and confusing. Law students 
find proximate causation to be one of the most challenging subjects in the Criminal 
Law course. If proximate causation is confusing to law students, it will likely be 
even more confusing for jurors with no background in the law. Moreover, the 
proximate causation rules are not always consistent; often one can reach whatever 
conclusion one wants depending on which rules one applies.268 It is beyond the scope 
of this Article to determine which, if any, causal standard ought to be imposed in 
officer-created jeopardy cases but I flag this as an issue that courts that allow 
antecedent conduct will want to address. 
 I would not recommend following the Tenth Circuit’s requirement that the 
officer’s prior decision or act must have been intentional or reckless.269 Intent and 
recklessness in the criminal law are subjective states of mind and, while relevant to 
whether or not the officer had the requisite mental state for commission of the crime 
for which the officer has been charged, would add a layer of unnecessary complexity 
to the question of whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable. Except in a very 
few jurisdictions, the justifiable force defense reflects an objective reasonableness 
standard under which the trier of fact must compare the beliefs and acts of the officer 
on trial to those of the reasonable officer. To require that the jury find that the 
antecedent conduct of the officer was intentional or reckless would require an 
inquiry into the officer’s subjective state of mind at that earlier point in time. It is 
                                                            
266 See Zouhary, supra note 5 (arguing that courts should apply proximate causation 
analysis in § 1983 cases where the officer’s pre-seizure conduct created the need to use 
force); James, supra note 5 (arguing that courts in § 1983 cases should utilize tort law 
concepts of proximate causation to decide whether the officer’s pre-seizure conduct caused 
the police use of force and the victim’s injuries); Kimber, supra note 5 (proposing a closer 
fit between the pre-seizure conduct and the use of force akin to proximate causation in 
torts); Balisacan, supra note 5, at 354 (arguing that litigants should use the proximate cause 
approach, asserting that an officer’s previous acts proximately caused the resulting injury 
as opposed to arguing that those acts affect the reasonableness of the officer’s eventual use 
of force); McClellan, supra note 5 (arguing that traditional principles of causation in tort 
law can be applied to the Graham v. Connor reasonableness analysis in excessive force 
cases). 
267 See Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995); Medina v. Cram, 252 
F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001). 
268 For example, [CL to provide an example of how one can apply intervening cause 
analysis to reach one conclusion, but apply one of the special rules to reach another 
conclusion] 
269 See Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995); Medina v. Cram, 252 
F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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already difficult to prove intent and awareness in the prosecution’s case in chief. It 
would add to the prosecution’s burden to require it to prove intent or awareness in 
rebutting the officer-defendant’s claim of justifiable force.  
It is best to keep things simple and simply say that if an officer’s antecedent 
conduct created or increased the risk of the encounter turning deadly, the jury may 
consider that conduct as part of the totality of the circumstances. In weighing all the 
facts and circumstances, the jury may either accept or reject the officer’s claim of 
justifiable force. The mere fact that an officer’s antecedent conduct created or 
increased the risk of a deadly confrontation does not mean the jury must find the 
officer guilty of the charged offense just as lack of such conduct does not mean the 
jury must find the officer not guilty. 
 
E. Possible Objections 
 
This section explains and responds to just a few of the possible objections 
to allowing the consideration of officer conduct that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation, i.e., officer-created jeopardy conduct. First, one might object to 
allowing the jury to consider such conduct on the ground that this will unfairly tilt 
the scales against the officer. Second, one might object on the ground that such 
conduct is irrelevant. Third, one might object on the ground that allowing the jury 
to consider such conduct will cause police officers to hesitate and cost police officer 
lives. Finally, one might object on the ground that in the Fourth Amendment context, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has time and again stated that even if the police create the 
conditions allowing a particular exception to the warrant requirement to apply, as 
long as the police officer’s conduct was lawful or not violative of the Fourth 
Amendment, the exception will apply. 
 
1. Objection 1: Consideration of Officer-Created Jeopardy Will 
Unfairly Tilt the Scales Against the Officer  
 
Law enforcement officers might object to allowing or requiring the jury to 
consider police conduct that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation on the 
ground that this will unfairly tilt the scales against the charged officer. Officers may 
worry that once the jury considers police conduct that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation, it will necessarily find against the officer on trial.  
This, however, is not necessarily what will happen. Allowing, or even 
requiring, the jury to consider antecedent conduct of the officer that increased the 
risk of a deadly confrontation is not the same as a directive telling the jury that they 
must find the officer guilty if the officer did something that increased the risk of a 
deadly confrontation. Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, a jury 
considering conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation 
may find that the officer’s use of force was reasonable and therefore justified or it 
may find that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable and not justified.270 
                                                            
270 See, e.g., Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, No. 98-CV-6063, 2001 WL 
1168093 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2001) (rejecting plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial after jury 
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Indeed, the same forces that encourage jurors today to find in favor of law 
enforcement officers who are charged with a crime of violence are likely to continue 
to operate even in jurisdictions that allow or require the jury to consider antecedent 
police conduct that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation. Jurors know that 
police officers have to work under uncertain, rapidly evolving and potentially 
dangerous conditions and that officers put their lives on the line to protect the 
community’s safety.271 Many jurors are and will continue to be reluctant to send an 
officer to prison for using deadly force on the job especially if the victim was in fact 
armed. Even in cases in which it turned out the victim was unarmed, the jury may 
give the officer the benefit of the doubt and acquit the officer if the officer testifies 
that he honestly but mistakenly believed the victim had a weapon and provides 
reasons that support his belief, such as the victim’s refusal to show his hands or the 
victim moving his hands towards his waistband, a place where individuals with guns 
often keep their guns. Allowing the jury to consider antecedent conduct of the officer 
simply helps to balance the scales so that the scales are not tilted overwhelmingly in 
favor of the officer from the start. 
For an example of this, we might consider the Breonna Taylor case, which 
illustrates how an officer’s antecedent conduct may increase the risk of a deadly 
confrontation yet not necessarily result in a finding of unjustifiable force.272 Breonna 
Taylor was a 26-year-old Black woman who worked as an emergency medical 
technician (EMT) and shared an apartment in Louisville, Kentucky with her sister.273 
                                                            
found police officers not liable despite hearing evidence “that [Officer] Hood failed to 
identify himself, had his gun drawn as he walked towards [the] car, began to fire before the 
car even started to accelerate, and stood in one spot as he fired, with no apparent concern 
for his safety”); Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 584-85, 586 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial 
of plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial following jury verdict in favor of defendant police 
officers despite evidence that officers failed to knock and announce prior to entering 
residence and then fatally shot a woman with a gun within).  
271 Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force, supra note 11, at 638. 
272 It is important to note that the facts of the Taylor case are highly contested. In highly 
contested cases, reasonable individuals may consider the same facts and come to different 
conclusions. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. 
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) (discussing 
results of a study in which approximately 1,350 Americans viewed the same dashcam 
video of the high-speed police chase in the Scott v. Harris case yet disagreed about whether 
the police officer who rammed his patrol car into the back of Harris’s vehicle, rendering 
him a quadriplegic, used reasonable versus excessive force). Moreover, much of the 
evidence that is known to the government and the attorneys for Taylor’s family is not 
publicly available, so the analysis offered here may not be complete. 
273 Darcy Costello & Tessa Duvall, 'Get Your Damn Story Straight': What We Know About 
Louisville Woman Breonna Taylor's Death, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/05/14/breonna-taylor-what-know-
louisville-emt-killed-police/5189743002/ (https://perma.cc/38BA-F6HN) (discussing the 
March 13, 2020 shooting death of Breonna Taylor, a 26 year old emergency room 
technician) (hereinafter Costello & Duvall, ‘Get your damn story straight’); Costello & 
Duvall, Minute by Minute, supra note 2 (discussing the March 13, 2020 shooting death of 
Breonna Taylor and noting that “Taylor's sister, Juniyah Palmer, typically stayed in the 
second bedroom”). 
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Taylor, who had no prior criminal history, was killed by police during the execution 
of a search warrant on her home.274 The police were investigating suspected drug 
trafficking activity involving firearms.275 One of the targets of their investigation 
was a man named Jamarcus Glover.276 Glover, a former boyfriend of Taylor’s, had 
been seen by police entering and leaving Taylor’s apartment and police believed he 
was using Taylor’s home to stash drugs or drug money.277  
In the early morning hours of March 13, 2020, Taylor and her boyfriend, 
Kenneth Walker were awoken by loud banging on the front door of Taylor’s 
apartment.278 They called out, “Who’s there?” but did not hear a response.279 
Thinking they were about to be robbed, Walker, a licensed gun owner, grabbed his 
gun.280 When two plain clothes officers burst through the door,281 Walker fired one 
shot, which hit one of the officers in the leg.282 The officers returned fire.283 In the 
hail of bullets, Taylor was shot and killed.284 No drugs were found in Taylor’s 
apartment.285 
                                                            
274 Costello & Duvall, Minute by Minute, supra note 2; Rukmini Callimachi, Breonna 
Taylor’s Life Was Changing. Then the Police Came to Her Door, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/30/us/breonna-taylor-police-killing.html 
(https://perma.cc/22PC-CEAT) (noting that Taylor had “had no criminal record and was 
never the target of an inquiry” and that the police only considered her of any interest 
because of her association with her ex-boyfriend, Jamarcus Glover).  
275 Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 
(Mar. 12, 2020); Jaynes Aff. for Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, 
KY 40214, No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020). 
276 Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 
(Mar. 12, 2020); Jaynes Aff. for Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, 
KY 40214, No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020). 
277 Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 
(Mar. 12, 2020); Jaynes Aff. for Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, 
KY 40214, No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020). 
278 Costello & Duvall, Minute by Minute, supra note 2.  
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 Noel King, No Arrests or Charges So Far In Breonna Taylor's Shooting Death, NPR 
(July 13, 2020) (5:08 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/13/890328388/no-arrests-or-
charges-so-far-in-breonna-taylors-shooting-death/ (https://perma.cc/5SDZ-UD93) (noting 
that the officers were in plain clothes). 
282 Costello & Duvall, Minute by Minute, supra note 2 (noting that “[w]hen police entered, 
Walker fired one shot — which he described as a "warning," because he thought intruders 
were breaking in — and struck Mattingly in the leg”). Initially, Walker claimed that Taylor 
shot the officer. 20/20: Say Her Name: Breonna Taylor, ABC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2020), 
https://abc.com/shows/2020/episode-guide/2020-11/20-say-her-name-breonna-taylor 
(showing Walker telling police in the parking lot of Taylor’s apartment that Taylor shot the 
gun). Walker was arrested and charged with attempted murder. Costello, Minute by Minute, 
supra note 2. Those charges were later dropped. Id. 
283 See Say Her Name: Breonna Taylor, supra note 282. 
284 Id. 
285 Costello & Duvall, Minute by Minute, supra note 2 (noting that “[n]o drugs were 
recovered from Taylor's home”). While it appears that the police were wrong about 
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If we focus solely on the moment when the officers began shooting, the 
officers’ use of deadly force appears eminently reasonable. They had just entered an 
apartment, which they believed contained evidence of narcotics trafficking and 
possible firearms,286 with a search warrant,287 meaning a judge agreed there was 
probable cause to believe there was evidence of criminal activity within, and an 
occupant of the apartment had just fired a gun at them, hitting one of the officers. 
As a general matter, police officers are allowed to use deadly force when they 
reasonably believe such force is necessary to protect themselves or others from death 
or serious bodily injury.288 Since one of the officers had just been shot in the femoral 
artery,289 a jury could conclude that it was reasonable for the officers to believe they 
needed to use deadly force to protect themselves against death or further serious 
bodily injury.  
If, however, we broaden the time frame and consider whether any conduct 
of the police prior to the moment when the police returned fire increased the risk of 
a deadly confrontation, the reasonableness of the officers’ use of deadly force is not 
                                                            
Taylor’s apartment being used as a stash house since they didn’t find any drugs in Taylor’s 
apartment, the law requires assessment of the facts and circumstances known to the police 
at the time they applied for the search warrant when assessing whether probable cause to 
support the warrant existed. The law does not allow police to use the fact that they were 
correct in their belief that a residence contained firearms and drugs to justify after the fact a 
search warrant that was lacking in probable cause at the time that the warrant was issued. 
Similarly, the law does not allow the application of hindsight bias to fault the police if they 
have probable cause to believe a residence contains evidence of criminal activity at the 
time they apply for a search warrant but the search turns up no evidence of a crime.  
286 The search warrant indicated that the targets of the investigation were suspected of 
owning firearms. Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, 
No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020). Many policymakers believe drug trafficking and firearms go 
hand in hand, which is why law enforcement officers believe the execution of search 
warrants on residences suspected of drug trafficking to be particularly dangerous and risky. 
See ATF Press Release, Ronald A. Parsons Jr., United States Attorney for the District of 
South Dakota, Eagle Butte Man Indicted on Drug Trafficking and Firearm Charges (Sept. 
14, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/eagle-butte-man-indicted-drug-trafficking-and-
firearm-charges (https://perma.cc/9SSF-DC2Y) (noting "[i]t is common to find drug 
traffickers armed with guns in order to protect their illegal drug product and cash, and 
enforce their illegal operations"); Meagan Docherty, et al., Drug Dealing and Gun 
Carrying Go Hand in Hand: Examining How Juvenile Offenders’ Gun Carrying Changes 
Before and After Drug Dealing Spells Across 84 Months, 36 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 993, 994 (2020) (noting “[y]outh who deal drugs are more likely to carry 
guns, possibly to defend their turf from rivals, discourage theft of their supply, and/or 
resolve violent disputes likely to occur in open air drug markets”).  
287 Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 
(Mar. 12, 2020). 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 45 - 47 (discussing state use of force statutes).  
289 Laurel Wamsley, Louisville Police Officer Files Lawsuit Against Boyfriend Of Breonna 
Taylor NPR (Oct. 30, 2020) (2:32 PM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/30/929563647/louisville-police-officer-files-lawsuit-
against-boyfriend-of-breonna-taylor (https://perma.cc/9VAJ-ZQ66) (noting that Sgt. 
Jonathan Mattingly was shot in the femoral artery in his upper thigh). 
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so clear. A lawsuit filed by Breonna Taylor’s family asserts that the officers violated 
the constitutional requirement that police knock and identify themselves prior to 
entering a residence.290 The officers, however, claim they banged on the door several 
times and shouted police before they entered the apartment.291 
The Supreme Court has held that, as part of the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirement, officers executing a search warrant must knock and 
identify themselves as police prior to entering a home.292 There are several reasons 
for requiring officers to knock and announce prior to entry. Knocking and 
announcing helps protect the lives of both occupants and the police by giving the 
occupants notice that officers with lawful authority, not criminals, are at the door.293 
Knocking and announcing also serves to protect dignity and privacy interests by 
giving the occupants, who may be in a state of undress, the ability to compose 
themselves before answering the door.294 Knocking and announcing also helps to 
                                                            
290 Doha Madani, FBI Investigating Death of Breonna Taylor, Killed by Police in Her 
Louisville Home, NBC News (May 21, 2020) (4:27 PM ET), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-investigating-death-breonna-taylor-killed-
police-her-louisville-home-n1212381 (https://perma.cc/9C8U-2U2C).  
291 Doha Madani, FBI investigating death of Breonna Taylor, killed by police in her 
Louisville home, NBC NEWS (May 21, 2020) (4:27 PM EDT) (reporting that a police 
spokesperson claimed the officers knocked on the door several times and “announced their 
presence as police” prior to entry), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-
investigating-death-breonna-taylor-killed-police-her-louisville-home-n1212381 
(https://perma.cc/9C8U-2U2C). 
292 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
incorporates the common law requirement that police officers entering a dwelling must 
knock on the door and announce their identity before forcibly entering). The Fourth 
Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule, however, is not an absolute rule. The Court has 
also held that if there is reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be futile 
or dangerous, then officers do not have to knock and announce. Id. at 936 (recognizing that 
the knock-and-announce requirement can give way “under circumstances presenting a 
threat of physical evidence” or “where police officers have reason to believe that evidence 
would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given”). 
293 Id. at 932.  
294 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (recognizing that the knock and 
announce rule protects privacy and dignity interests that can be destroyed by sudden 
entrance without notice). In February 2019, for example, Chicago police broke down the 
door of an innocent Black woman’s home with a battering ram and handcuffed the social 
worker while she was naked. Dom Calicchio, Chicago mayor 'blindsided' by report of 
botched police raid, handcuffed naked woman, FOX NEWS (Dec. 17, 2020), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/chicago-mayor-blindsided-by-report-of-botched-
police-raid-handcuffed-naked-woman (perma.cc/LMK8-C8XT). Anjanette Young had just 
come home from work and was changing when the officers broke into her home. Id. The 
officers got the wrong house; the person they were looking for lived next door. Id. Video 
of the botched raid, showing Young crying “You’ve got the wrong home,” numerous 
times, was not released until December 2020. Id. 
61 Officer-Created Jeopardy [2-1-2021] 
 
 
protect against property damage by giving the occupants within the chance to answer 
the door before police break it down.295 
If officers fail to knock and identify themselves prior to entering a residence, 
arguably the officer’s conduct (or lack thereof) will increase the risk of a deadly 
confrontation because occupants within the residence might think, as Walker and 
Talker thought, that the officers are would-be robbers or burglars. Not knowing that 
those entering the residence are police, the occupants of the residence might try to 
stop the intruders by using deadly force in self-defense. If occupants of a residence 
try to shoot police officers entering that residence, the entering officers are likely to 
respond with deadly force to protect themselves from getting shot and killed by the 
occupants.  
In the Breonna Taylor case, the police requested a no knock warrant through 
an affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant.296 The judge incorporated 
that affidavit by reference, so it appears the judicial officer intended to issue a no 
knock warrant,297 giving the officers who executed the search warrant the authority 
to enter Taylor’s apartment without knocking and announcing in advance.298 The 
                                                            
295 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. at 594. 
296 See Jaynes Aff. for Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 
40214, No. 20-1371 (Mar. 12, 2020). A no-knock warrant authorizes the police to enter a 
residence without knocking and announcing prior to entry. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 
U.S. 385, 396 n.7 (1997) (“A number of States give magistrate judges the authority to issue 
‘no-knock’ warrants if the officers demonstrate ahead of time a reasonable suspicion that 
entry without prior announcement will be appropriate in a given context.”); 2 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.8(g), Westlaw 
(database updated Sept. 2020) (noting that “[a] small number of jurisdictions have adopted 
legislation permitting magistrates to issue search warrants specifically authorizing entry 
without prior announcement upon a sufficient showing to the magistrate of a need to do so, 
either to prevent destruction of evidence or to prevent harm to the executing officer.”). A 
judicial officer may issue a no-knock warrant if the judicial officer finds reasonable 
suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous or lead to the destruction of 
evidence. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 396 n.7. See also Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 
936 (1995). 
297 Search Warrant for 3003 Springfield Drive #4, Louisville, KY 40214, No. 20-1371 
(Mar. 12, 2020); Costello & Duvall, Minute by Minute, supra note 2 (noting that Louisville 
Metropolitan Police Department Detective Joshua Jaynes wrote five affidavits seeking a 
judge's permission for no-knock searches for five different residences, one of which was 
for Breonna Taylor’s apartment, related to a narcotics investigation and that Jefferson 
Circuit Judge Mary Shaw issued all five no knock search warrants).  
298 Some legal scholars have raised questions about whether the judge’s statement in the 
warrant that she was incorporating by reference the affidavit was sufficient to make the 
warrant a no-knock warrant. Conversations with Jonathan Witmer-Rich at and after the 
2020 Virtual ABA Criminal Justice Section Academic Roundtable on November 12, 2020. 
See also Jonathan Witmer-Rich and Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, The Common Law’s Search 
Rules Should Have Protected Breonna Taylor (work in progress) (draft on file with author). 
There appears to be a split in the federal courts over whether a search warrant that 
incorporates by reference an affidavit requesting no knock authority gives the police the 
authority to enter a residence without knocking and identifying themselves prior to entry. 
For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that the mere fact that a magistrate judge 
62 Officer-Created Jeopardy [2-1-2021] 
 
 
officers executing the warrant, who were not the same as the officer who prepared 
the affidavit, were told at the last minute by a police supervisor to knock and 
announce because Taylor was a “soft target,”299 which explains why the officers 
banged on the door to Taylor’s residence even though they had the authority not to 
knock.  
Hearing these facts, a jury could find that the officers’ use of deadly force 
was justifiable even if the jury also believed that the officers failed to identify 
themselves as police prior to entry and thereby increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation.300 It is difficult to hold officers liable for shooting in response to being 
shot if they were acting within their constitutional authority. 
Complicating the analysis is the fact that the validity of the search warrant 
has been called into question. The attorneys for the family have asserted that there 
was a false statement in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, and therefore 
the entire warrant should be invalidated.301 If the judge were to find the remaining 
                                                            
incorporates by reference an affidavit that requests no knock authority is not sufficient to 
grant no knock authority. United States v. Smith, 386 F.3d 753, 761 (6th Cir. 2004). In 
contrast, the Seventh Circuit has held that a search warrant that incorporates by reference 
an affidavit that asks for no knock authority is a no-knock warrant even if the magistrate 
judge does not explicitly grant no knock authority on the face of the warrant. United States 
v. Mattison, 153 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1998).  
299 Radley Balko, Correcting the misinformation about Breonna Taylor, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 24, 2020) (4:50 p.m. EDT), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/24/correcting-misinformation-about-
breonna-taylor/ (https://perma.cc/3WLM-AU8T) (noting that “[t]he police claim[ed] they 
were told after the fact to disregard the no-knock portion and instead knock and announce 
themselves, because, by that point, someone had determined that Taylor was a “soft target” 
— not a threat, and not a major player in the drug investigation”). 
300 In a state like Kentucky, where an estimated 54.6 percent of adults own a gun, it should 
have been foreseeable to the officers that breaking down the door to a home might lead a 
licensed gunowner to react the way Kenneth Walker reacted. TERRY L. SCHELL ET AL., 
RAND CORPORATION, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF HOUSEHOLD FIREARM OWNERSHIP 21 
(2020). 
301 Darcy Costello, Breonna Taylor Attorneys: LMPD Supplied ‘False Information’ on 
‘No-Knock’ Warrant, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (May 16, 2020), https://www.courier-
journal.com/story/news/local/2020/05/16/breonna-taylor-attorneys-say-police-supplied-
false-information/5205334002/ (https://perma.cc/5ATZ-CPUM). The Supreme Court has 
held that if there is a false statement in the affidavit supporting a search warrant and that 
statement was made either knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, that 
statement must be stricken from the affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 
(1978) (holding a hearing must be held when a defendant makes a substantial preliminary 
showing that a false statement necessary to the finding of probable cause was included in 
the warrant affidavit either knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the 
truth). Given the allegation of a false statement in the warrant affidavit, a judicial officer 
would need to decide (1) whether the statement was indeed false; (2) whether the officer 
who prepared the affidavit knowingly lied or included the statement with reckless disregard 
for the truth or falsity of the statement; and (3) whether the rest of the information in the 
affidavit is sufficient to support the initial finding of probable cause to believe contraband 
or evidence of a crime was in Taylor’s apartment. Id. (holding that if the allegation of 
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information in the affidavit  insufficient to support such the finding of probable 
cause, then the entire warrant would be invalid.302 If the warrant in the Taylor case 
were to be invalidated, then the entry into Taylor’s apartment would be treated as a 
warrantless entry. A jury might then find that entering a home without a warrant in 
the middle of the night unnecessarily and unlawfully increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation and conclude that the officers’ later use of deadly force was 
unreasonable. 
 
2. Objection 2: An Officer’s Antecedent Conduct That 
Increased the Risk of a Deadly Confrontation Is Irrelevant to 
Whether the Officer’s Use of Deadly Force Was Justified  
 
 A second objection is that an officer’s antecedent conduct—even if that 
conduct increased the risk of a deadly confrontation—is irrelevant and therefore 
should not considered by the jury. There are two variations to this argument. 
 First, this irrelevancy objection is akin to the reasoning of the federal circuit 
courts of appeal that disallow consideration of pre-seizure conduct. Under this 
reasoning, the only thing that matters under the Fourth Amendment is whether the 
seizure itself was unreasonable, not whether the officer’s pre-seizure actions were 
unreasonable.303 Therefore, the only events and circumstances the jury should 
consider are those that were present at the moment of the seizure, not events and 
circumstances that preceded that time.304 
While this argument is not persuasive even in the §1983 context given the 
Supreme Court’s clear direction that the jury should consider the totality of the 
circumstances when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force and the 
fact that an officer’s pre-seizure conduct is simply a circumstance in the totality of 
the circumstances,305 it is even less convincing in the context of a state criminal 
prosecution of a law enforcement officer where the focus is not on whether the 
individual has been reasonably seized. The concept of seizure is only relevant if the 
issue is whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated, not when the issue is whether 
an officer’s claim of justifiable force should lead to his acquittal. 
A second permutation of this irrelevancy argument is that antecedent 
conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation would  only 
                                                            
perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the 
evidence and the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, 
the search warrant must be voided).  
302 Id. It is unclear whether the entire warrant would be invalidated. The family’s attorneys 
have alleged that the following sentence in the affidavit is false: “Affiant verified through a 
US Postal Inspector that Jamarcus Glover has been receiving packages at 3003 Springfield 
Drive #4.” Darcy Costello, Breonna Taylor Attorneys: LMPD Supplied ‘False Information’ 
on ‘No-Knock’ Warrant, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (May 16, 2020), https://www.courier-
journal.com/story/news/local/2020/05/16/breonna-taylor-attorneys-say-police-supplied-
false-information/5205334002/ (https://perma.cc/N7S2-8W8M). 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 89-98. 
304 See supra text accompanying notes 89-98. 
305 See supra text accompanying notes 105-119. 
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be relevant in a state criminal prosecution if an officer is charged with a crime like 
reckless endangerment, involuntary manslaughter, or murder of the depraved heart 
variety, i.e., cases in which the state must prove a reckless or grossly reckless state 
of mind.306 If, prior to using deadly force, the officer recklessly increased the risk of 
a deadly confrontation, the officer’s reckless antecedent conduct would support the 
state’s argument that the defendant acted recklessly and thus had the requisite mens 
rea for the charged offense. If, however, an officer is charged with a crime that 
requires intent as the mens rea, such as murder under an intent to kill theory of malice 
aforethought, then the officer’s prior reckless conduct is not relevant since it would 
not show that the officer had the requisite intent to kill.  
This objection rests on the fact that most state use of force laws today focus 
on whether the officer’s belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable without 
separately requiring reasonable action on the part of the officer. If the only question 
the jury needs to answer is whether the officer reasonably believed it was necessary 
to use deadly force at the moment when he pulled the trigger, then arguably the only 
things that matter are the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the moment 
when the officer made the decision to use deadly force. 
My response to this objection is twofold. First, at least a few state use of 
force statutes today explicitly require a finding of reasonable action or reasonable 
use of force by the officer.307 In these states, an officer’s prior conduct that created 
or increased the risk of a deadly confrontation is relevant to the overall 
reasonableness of the officer’s ultimate use of force because the jury must assess the 
overall reasonableness of the officer’s actions.  
Second, in states that use reasonable belief language in their use of force 
statutes and do not explicitly require reasonable action in addition to a reasonable 
belief, a reasonable act is implicitly required.308 After all, the primary underlying 
question in cases where the officer has been charged with a crime of violence and 
claims justifiable force is whether the officer’s use of force was excessive or 
appropriate. Whether or not the use of force statute explicitly requires the jury to 
find a reasonable act, the main question the jury must decide is whether the officer’s 
use of force was reasonable or unreasonable. An officer’s prior conduct that 
unnecessarily increased the risk of a deadly confrontation is thus relevant because it 
suggests the officer’s later use of force may not be as reasonable as it might appear 
without such consideration. 
 
                                                            
306 I thank Jonathan Witmer-Rich for raising this objection at the ABA Criminal Justice 
Section’s Virtual Academic Roundtable on November 12, 2020. 
307 See text accompanying notes 10-13 and 24 (discussing police use of deadly force 
legislation requiring both reasonable beliefs and reasonable action enacted in 2020 in the 
District of Columbia, Connecticut and Virginia). In addition, Vermont enacted police use 
of force legislation in 2020 that requires a finding that the officer’s use of deadly force was 
reasonable without also requiring a finding that the officer’s beliefs were reasonable. See 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2368 (2020). 
308 See Lee, Reforming the Law of Police Use of Deadly Force, supra note 11, at 683.  
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3. Third Objection: Allowing Juries to Consider Antecedent Conduct 
of the Officer that Increased the Risk of a Deadly Confrontation 
Will Cause Officers to Hesitate and Will Cost Officers Their Lives 
 
 A third objection to allowing juries to consider antecedent conduct of the 
officer that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation is that officers will hesitate 
and refrain from using deadly force in situations in which they should use such force, 
and this will cost them their lives.309 This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. 
First, when an officer feels his or her life is in danger, the instinct to self-preserve 
will likely overcome any worry about future prosecution. Second, law enforcement 
officers should try to act in ways that reduce the risk that encounters with civilians 
turn deadly. One way to encourage officers to engage in tactical decisions that 
reduce the risk that the officer will need to use deadly force is by making sure the 
trier of fact can consider the conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a deadly 
confrontation. 
As Brandon Garrett and Seth Stoughton point out in their excellent article, 
A Tactical Fourth Amendment, good police officers are trained to reduce the risk 
that an encounter with a civilian will escalate and turn into a deadly confrontation.310 
Indeed “[t]he focus of sound tactical training is on giving officers time to make 
decisions from a position of safety and to de-escalate to avoid the need for force.”311 
Creating time is an essential part of good police practice because “[e]ven the best-
trained officers may have bad judgment when they are forced to make truly split-
second decisions, in large part because they lack the time to consider alternative 
approaches.”312 Garrett and Stoughton note that “a decision made early in an 
encounter, or even before an encounter begins, when there is no time pressure can 
avoid putting officers into a position where they have to make a time-pressured 
decision.”313 If an officer acts contrary to such tactical training, unnecessarily 
creating or increasing the risk that an encounter will require the use of deadly force, 
that officer is acting unreasonably.314  
                                                            
309 As Seth Stoughton notes, “In the use-of-force context, the instrumental concern is 
reflected in the prediction that aggressive review and criticism may lead officers to 
improperly hesitate or refrain from using force when the situation legitimately requires it, 
thus exposing themselves and others to unnecessary danger.” Stoughton, How the Fourth 
Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, supra note 5, at 683 (“By 
disaggregating beliefs from actions, and requiring jurors to find that the officer's beliefs 
and actions were both reasonable, my model legislation makes explicit the normative 
inquiry that is merely implicit in most current statutes.”). 
310 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 5, at 302 (“A tactical Fourth Amendment analysis 
would focus on whether officers acted contrary to sound police tactics by unreasonably 
creating a deadly situation, and asking whether a cautious approach could have given them 
time to take cover, give warnings, and avoid the need to use deadly force”).  
311 Id. at 219. 
312 Id. at 253. 
313 Id. at 259. 
314 STOUGHTON, ET AL., EVALUATING POLICE USE OF FORCE, supra note 4, at 155 (noting 
that “an officer’s poor tactics can expose them to an otherwise avoidable threat, which 
increases the likelihood that they will use force to address that threat.”). 




4. Fourth Objection: The Supreme Court Has Made Clear in Other 
Contexts that an Officer’s Antecedent Conduct Does Not Affect the 
Constitutionality of the Officer’s Later Actions  
 
A fourth objection relies on the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
suggested, in other contexts, that a law enforcement officer’s prior conduct creating 
the conditions allowing an exception to the warrant requirement to apply does not 
negatively affect the constitutionality of the officer’s later actions so long as the 
officer’s prior conduct was lawful. Therefore, according to this argument, an 
officer’s antecedent lawful conduct that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation 
should not affect the reasonableness of the officer’s later use of force.  
For example, in Kentucky v. King,315 the Court considered whether the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement “applies when police, 
by knocking on the door of a residence and announcing their presence, cause the 
occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.”316 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that 
because the police were the ones who created the exigency by banging on the door 
to the wrong apartment and announcing their identity as police officers, the 
government could not rely on the exigent circumstances exception to excuse the lack 
of search warrant.317 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Kentucky 
Supreme Court and allowed application of the exigent circumstances rule, holding 
that because the conduct of the officers prior to their entry into the apartment was 
lawful, i.e., in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, it did not matter that the 
officers created the exigency.318  
                                                            
315 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
316 Id. at 455. 
317 King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Ky. 2010) (“We hold that police were 
not in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and that, with regard to the imminent destruction of 
evidence, any exigency was police-created”). In this case, police set up a controlled buy of 
crack cocaine outside an apartment complex. 563 U.S. at 455. An undercover officer 
observed the buy from an unmarked police car in a nearby parking lot. Id.  at 455-56. After 
the buy concluded, the officer signaled to other officers to arrest the suspect who was 
moving quickly towards the breezeway of an apartment building. Id. at 456. Uniformed 
police officers ran to the breezeway. Id. They heard a door shut and detected the odor of 
marijuana. Id. At the end of the breezeway, the officers found two apartments. Id. They did 
not know which apartment the suspect had entered. Id. Because they smelled marijuana 
coming from the apartment on the left, they banged loudly on the door of that apartment 
and announced that they were the police. Id. As soon as they started banging on the door, 
they heard people inside moving. Id. Thinking that drug-related evidence was about to be 
destroyed, the officers kicked in the door and entered the apartment where they found 
marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. Id. at 456-57. The officers later discovered 
that the initial target of their investigation had run into the apartment on the right. Id. at 
457. 
318 563 U.S. at 469 (“we conclude that the exigent circumstances rule applies when the 
police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the 
Fourth Amendment”). 
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Another example of the Supreme Court disregarding officer-created conduct 
leading to application of an exception to the warrant requirement can be found in the 
third party consent context. In Georgia v. Randolph, the Court held that “a 
warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of 
consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him 
on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.”319 In explaining the 
parameters of its decision, the Court stated, “So long as there is no evidence that the 
police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake 
of avoiding a possible objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of 
complementary rules, one recognizing the co-tenant’s permission when there is no 
fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the fellow 
occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it.”320 This language seemed to 
suggest that if police officers purposely removed the target of the investigation from 
the home in order avoid having that individual present and objecting to police entry, 
then the consent of the remaining co-tenant would not be valid and the warrantless 
entry into the home would violate the Fourth Amendment.  
In Fernandez v. California,321 however, the Court rejected that 
interpretation of this language. The defendant in Fernandez argued that the above 
specified language in Georgia v. Randolph meant the warrantless entry into his home 
was invalid since the police removed him after hearing his objection to their entry 
in order to obtain consent to entry from his co-tenant without having him present 
and objecting at the entrance to the home.322  
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, rejected the defendant’s argument, 
calling the above language from Georgia v. Randolph dictum.323 Justice Alito 
explained that because the police had probable cause to arrest Fernandez for 
domestic violence, his removal from the premises was lawful and therefore it did 
not matter that the officers may have removed him to avoid having him physically 
present and objecting when they went back to seek his co-tenant’s consent to their 
entry.324 Justice Alito explained that “an occupant who is absent due to a lawful 
detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any 
other reason.”325 
I think the Court was wrong to reject the police-created emergency doctrine 
in Kentucky v. King. I also disagree with the Fernandez v. California Court’s refusal 
to recognize the language in Georgia v. Randolph clearly stating that if police 
remove a tenant from the entrance to the home in order to avoid a possible objection, 
the consent of the remaining co-tenant should not suffice to uphold the warrantless 
entry. Nonetheless, these decisions were in line with the Court’s other Fourth 
                                                            
319 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006). 
320 Id. at 121. 
321 Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292 (2014). 
322 Id. at 302 
323 Id. (“In Randolph, the Court suggested in dictum that consent by one occupant might 
not be sufficient if there is ‘evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting 
tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection.’”). 
324 Id. at 302-03. 
325 Id. at 303. 
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Amendment decisions disregarding the police officer’s subjective intent and 
favoring police officers over civilians suspected of criminal activity.  
It is important to remember that what the Supreme Court has prescribed in 
the Fourth Amendment context does not determine what a state court or legislature 
can say about when police use of force is justified.326 State legislatures and state 
courts have the power and authority to be more protective of their citizens’ rights 
and go beyond what the Supreme Court has prescribed as the constitutional floor.327 
In officer-involved shooting cases, the Supreme Court has set “reasonableness” as 
the constitutional floor with little to no guidance as to what constitutes reasonable 
police conduct. State courts and legislatures can and should go above this floor and 
make clear that police conduct that increases the risk of a deadly confrontation can 
affect the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force and thus the trier of fact in a 
state criminal prosecution of a law enforcement officer who claims justifiable force 





When law enforcement officers put themselves in situations of danger that 
could have been avoided and then use deadly force to protect themselves, they 
engage in officer-created jeopardy. The trier of fact in a criminal prosecution against 
an officer who claims justifiable force should be allowed to consider this type of 
conduct when assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force. Not only is 
such conduct relevant, it is also unfair to disallow such consideration when the trier 
of fact is usually allowed to consider antecedent conduct of the victim as well as 
antecedent conduct of the officer that supports the officer’s decision to use force. In 
addition to the reasons outlined above for allowing the jury to consider antecedent 
conduct of the officer that increased the risk of a confrontation turning deadly, the 
jury in officer-involved shooting cases is told to assess the reasonableness of the 
officer’s use of force by considering the totality of the circumstances. Conduct of 
the officer that increased the risk of a deadly confrontation is just another factor in 
the totality of the circumstances that bears on the reasonableness of the officer’s use 
of deadly force. The jury should not be precluded from considering such relevant 
conduct. 
                                                            
326 See Flanders & Welling, supra note 25, at 125–26; Stoughton, How the Fourth 
Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, supra note 5, at 578 (noting that 
“[t]he interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment . . . are both distinct and, in many 
cases, readily distinguishable from the interests that underlie state law and agency 
policy.”). 
327 Stoughton, How the Fourth Amendment Frustrates the Regulation of Police Violence, 
supra note 5, at 579-82. 
